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1. CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1. Introduction 
Over the past decade, the world has witnessed significant changes in global and 
national polities and economies. These changes, which include a re-emergence of 
semi-authoritarian regimes have had a substantial effect on the space for civil society 
advocacy across the world. In Uganda, there has been an undulation between the 
promising eras of democratization in the early and mid-90s to low days of oppressive 
legislations and institutions. What these changes dictate is that stakeholders working 
within and outside the state ought to change their approach and strategies to cope with 
the changes in the rules of engagement, but also win and sustain their operating space.  
This paper explores the strategies employed by civil society actors to win and sustain 
space for operation in Uganda’s semi-authoritarian setting. The analysis is situated in 
Uganda’s Semi-Dominant Neo-Patrimonial Space, characterized by patronage and 
party dominance. Two case studies from civil society advocacy initiatives in Uganda 
have been explored to delineate key lessons for civil society advocacy across the world. 
The case studies are the NGO Legislative Advocacy and the Campaign for Free and 
Fair Elections. Both initiatives averred to influence legislative outcomes in a context that 
is characterised by patronage and state non-responsiveness. 
1.2. Purpose of the Study 
The purpose of this study is to examine contrasting advocacy strategies deployed by 
civil society organisations in Uganda during the different phases of the Free and Fair 
Elections Campaign and the NGO Legislative Advocacy. A close analysis is done to 
reveal how civic actors used collaborative techniques and strategies to achieve 
advocacy results especially in Uganda’s context.  
1.3. Problem Statement  
There are a number of studies that delineate the role of civil society in development and 
governance. Existing research explains strategies employed by different civil society 
and activist organizations to achieve results, especially in advanced, functional, and 
sustainable democracies with impersonal governance rules, and institutions. However, 
the proposed strategies are often devoid of clear description and characterization of the 
contexts in which these organizations operate which, leads to failure to achieve the 
desired results. Most of these proposed strategies do not go beyond the traditional best 
practice strategies of advocacy, with blurred links to the contextual realities. For civil 
society organizations operating in semi-authoritarian contexts, where the rules of 
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engagement are different and functional democracy is in short supply, the strategies 
proposed in existing research are more often than not ill-fitting. 
1.4. Research Questions 
The key question under investigation in this research is how can civil society achieve 
advocacy results in semi-dominant neo-patrimonial spaces? What works and what does 
not work? To exhaustively explore this question the following questions structured 
around the two case studies will be answered: 
o What key advocacy strategies were employed by civil society organisations in 
Uganda during the Free and Fair Elections Campaign and the Advocacy on the 
NGO Legislations? 
o Who were the key actors, and how did they relate with government institutions? 
o What contextual factors have shaped government-civil society relationships in 
Uganda? 
 
1.5. Hypotheses 
H1a: In semi-authoritarian political contexts, where civil society is relatively powerless, 
change cannot be achieved through ways that are contradictory and conflictual to the 
interests of a dominant regime. 
H1b: Therefore, incremental collaborative changes are preferable, and more effective 
than confrontational change options. 
H1c: The more collaborative civil society engagement is, the larger the scope and 
extent of incremental change is likely to be. 
1.6. Methodology, Process and Tools 
To explore the above hypotheses, I use a case study design. More specifically, two 
case studies are presented to explore the relationship between the actions of the civil 
society leaders, their advocacy strategies, and the response of government actors in 
Uganda’s context. The case studies take from two advocacy initiatives, that is; (i) NGO 
Legislation Advocacy (1999 – 2015) and (ii) the Free and Fair Elections Campaign 
(2012 – 2015). Through these, I generate evidence that explains the success and 
failures of civil society advocacy strategies and draw inferences that will be instrumental 
for civil society advocacy. 
I employ the empirical methodology of process tracing as a method for identifying and 
testing causal mechanisms; where causal mechanisms refer to the causal processes 
and intervening variables through which causal or explanatory variables produce causal 
effects (Bennett & George, 1997; Bennett & George, 2005). I use process tracing to 
examine the different explanations for the outcomes of the advocacy engagements at 
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different times in the advocacy process within the two case studies; and to make 
reasoned inferences on the most probable, feasible, and convincing explanations 
(Bennett, 2010) for the outcomes. 
As such, the method was used to develop a historical narrative that explores the critical 
junctures and causal links between the actions of the civil society actors and the 
response of Government. For better causal inferences, beyond snapshots of variations 
in strategies during these engagements, I trace the process across time and changes 
over time. The political events during the period in focus provide a contextualized 
setting in which to examine the effectiveness of the strategies and provide deeper 
understanding of the specific critical junctures that shaped change; bring to bear the 
different forces at play; and aid in making qualitative analysis of whether the hypotheses 
are robust or weak. 
More succinctly, in terms of the causal mechanisms, there are two factors I considered 
in determining what produces agreement between the government and civil society in 
advocacy. The two factors are content of the advocacy and the process through which 
outcomes are sought. ‘Content’ refers to form of ideas being advanced by civil society 
(whether highly threatening or easing) and the inferences around those ideas. It was 
observed from the empirical narrative that where the form of the ideas fundamentally 
challenged the stakeholders involved — and threatened the power and authority of the 
dominant state, specifically the top political leadership — the ideas were not considered 
on their own merits, were deemed undesirable, and were rejected by the state and state 
actors.  
On the other hand, where the ideas were packaged in ways that did not appear 
threatening to authority and the power of the top political leadership — ways that were 
easing to the political leadership — these ideas were accepted and adopted, bringing 
about incremental reforms. This supports hypothesis H1a: “In semi-authoritarian 
political contexts, where civil society is relatively powerless, change cannot be achieved 
through ways that are contradictory and conflictual to the interests of a dominant 
regime.” 
Secondly, ‘process’ refers to the engagement strategies employed, and the actions 
taken by civil society actors in their pursuit of reforms. These strategies can be 
categorized as collaborative or confrontational. With collaborative strategies, civil 
society actors mobilise, work with, and establish alliances with critical state actors. 
Negotiations around the content and ideas of reform take place, which inform critical 
concessions that cumulatively have the potential to lead to fundamental reforms. This 
takes place in ways that are not perceived by the top political leadership as threatening.  
It was observed that where civil society actors engaged more collaboratively with state 
actors in the development and negotiation of reform ideas, their proposals were 
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supported and adopted by Government and passed by parliament. The willingness of 
civil society actors to make concessions on some areas of their reform proposals made 
collaboration and mutual agreements possible. These observations support both 
hypothesis H1b: Collaborative incremental changes are preferable, and more effective 
than confrontational change options, and H1c: The more collaborative civil society 
engagement is, the larger the scope and extent of incremental change is likely to be. 
With confrontational strategies, civil society actors apply the demand and supply model 
to advocacy while working outside the state. This is based on the demand and supply 
model of good governance, where civil society actors focus on building citizen 
consensus on the nature and character of reforms and carryout actions that increase 
demand for the reforms — the assumption being that government actors and institutions 
would be compelled to supply and enact the reforms. Some of the actions in this 
strategy are the use of public protests and media campaigns to generate public demand 
for reform ideas. As seen from the empirical evidence generated; in semi-authoritarian 
settings, political leaders have control over most institutions of government and the 
state and are not easily threatened by public pressure. It follows, therefore, that for 
ideas contradictory to their interests to be accepted, they must receive the support of 
key state actors and constituencies. This calls for collaboration and the packaging of 
ideas in ways that ease any existing insecurities and tensions in the top leadership.  
1.6.1. Beyond Mechanisms to Process and Tools 
The historical narrative presented in Chapters 6 and 7 is generated through conducting 
personal Key Informant Interviews with central actors involved in the NGO Legislative 
Advocacy and the Campaign for Free and Fair Elections. The interviews were semi-
structured and targeted key actors from organizations that were actively engaged in the 
advocacy activities. These interviews were instrumental in unearthing critical junctures 
and determining causal links. They also furnished specific attributes and explanatory 
explorations for significant actions by the various stakeholders involved, and how these 
factors shaped the development of events. The interviewer/author made sure to 
explicitly acquire all the necessary clearance and consent from the interviewees and to 
quote the material generated for purposes of this research.  
To augment the findings of the Key Informant Interviews, news reports and newspaper 
articles were assembled to recreate an accurate description of events and their 
outcomes. Lastly, a comprehensive literature review about the conceptualization of the 
term civil society, civil society advocacy strategies, and a deconstruction of Uganda’s 
political context — in which this study is situated — were also carried out to provide a 
theoretical basis for the research.  
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1.7. Limitations of the Study 
The scope of this dissertation is limited to Uganda. The empirical work is based on two 
advocacy interventions by civil society organizations in Uganda, between 1999 and 
2016. The study by no means examines all advocacy initiatives by civil society during 
this period. Additionally, in spite of the fact that methodical and academic rigor has been 
ensured, the reliability of the study might be affected by the fact that the author was 
central to the coordination of the advocacy activities for the two initiatives between 2014 
and 2016. While the author has taken great care to remain objective in his narration of 
events, observer bias cannot be ruled out. 
2. CHAPTER 2: UNDERSTANDING THE CONCEPT OF CIVIL SOCIETY 
To provide a conceptual understanding of civil society, in this chapter, I explore key 
theories around civil society, its definition, characteristics and role in development. 
Although the idea of civil society has been widely discussed, the challenge of defining 
the concept has remained surprisingly difficult (Larok, 2009), and the term has 
conceptually remained fluid. One reason for this maybe that civil society is diverse, 
multifaceted, and broad (Viterna, Clough, & Clarke, 2015). Quite often, the term is 
interchangeably used in reference to Non-Government Organisations (Ibrahim, 2015; 
Pearce, 2000). However, to look at civil society through the narrow lens of NGOs is 
rather limiting: civil society takes different shapes. Working within the broader field of 
the third sector, or non-profit research, (Salamon & Anheier, 1992) have famously 
argued, in their attempt to define NGOs, that most definitions of the term have been 
either legal (focusing on the type of NGO), economic (based on the organisation’s 
source of funding) or functional (based on the type of activities undertaken). Appropriate 
definitions will therefore differ depending on the context in which the term is applied.   
In the liberal view, one that has been most popular with donors and governments, civil 
society is seen as an arena of organised citizens and a collection of organisations that 
act to balance the state and the market; a place where civic and democratic values can 
be upheld (Boulding, 2010; Lewis & Kanji, 2009). This implies that civil society is a wide 
range of groups, ranging from community organisations and movements, to consumer 
and producer associations, women’s and workers’ groups, and of course Non-
Governmental Organisations (Carroll, 1992; Edwards & Hulme, 1992) — the most 
common feature being that they operate outside of government and the state, and are 
mostly voluntary (Dicklitch, 1998; Lewis, 2010). 
In Uganda, the term civil society has unsurprisingly been erroneously and rather 
interchangeably used to mean NGOs. The NGO Act 2016 defines Organisations as 
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private voluntary groupings of individuals or associations established to provide 
voluntary services to the community or any part, but not for profit of commercial 
purposes (Government Of Uganda, 2016). The Act further distinguishes NGOs 
according to geographical coverage, place of original incorporation, and ownership. The 
National NGO Policy, on the other hand, provides a much broader definition; ‘any legally 
constituted private, voluntary grouping of individuals or associations involved in 
community work which augments government work but is clearly not for profit or 
commercial purposes (The Government of Uganda, 2010). The two definitions 
centralise the fact that NGOs operate not for profit, which provides one of the major 
distinctions between NGOs and private business. The Policy further recognises the role 
of NGOs in Uganda’s development and delineates their activities, such as mobilisation, 
sensitisation, consulting, and aggregating citizen’s interests and actions (The 
Government of Uganda, 2010). The levels at which NGOs perform these responsibilities 
include; agenda setting, policy formulation, monitoring, and ensuring transparency and 
accountability.  
For this particular paper, I use the term civil society to refer to all organised actors 
outside of the state and the market, which include, but are not limited to, Non-
Governmental Organisations. I also abstain from trying to make a distinction between 
NGOs and other forms of civil society since one is not only subset of the other, and thus 
may not make much conceptual distinction, but also because the distinction may not be 
useful due to what (Hulme, 2008) calls the ‘fluidity of analytical boundaries’. I shall 
therefore adopt (Heinrich & Khallaf, 2005) definition of civil society as simply the arena 
outside of the family, the state, and the market, where people associate to advance 
common interests. This definition represents the parameters within which this paper 
attempts to examine the question of civil society effectiveness: Firstly, it recognises 
citizens’ engagement which is central to citizens exercising their voice and secondly, it 
underscores the concept of association – the interaction between citizens and state 
actors.  This definition thus facilitates the appreciation that engagement in this ‘arena’ 
can take on different forms and that it may differ with differences in context. This may as 
well partially or wholly explain the divergences in effectiveness of interventions and 
advocacy. 
2.1. Historic Role of Civil Society in Development Practice 
In the past fifty years, civil society has rapidly gained recognition for its role in 
development policy and practice. Following the re-emergence of the New Policy Agenda 
in the early 1990s, and the consolidation of neoliberal and democratic governance 
reforms, mainstream development organisations such as the World Bank quickly 
identified CSOs as vehicles for advancing ideas about good governance (Mohanty, 
2002). They were viewed simultaneously as public actors that could support democratic 
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process in political spheres, and private market-based actors that could support service 
delivery where the state failed (Edwards & Hulme, 1992). It is no wonder that civil 
society organisations, especially NGOs, have now become part of the global 
governance and development system. 
The imposition of structural adjustment policies on many developing countries, 
especially in Africa, led to drastic cuts in the provision of social services. Some of the 
reforms required states to reduce economic interventions and emphasised a stronger 
role of the market, yet there existed very few indigenous private enterprises (Bratton, 
1989a). This left a huge gap in service delivery that non-state organisations attempted 
to fill. CSOs thus provided vehicles for people to participate in development and social 
change in ways that would not be possible through conventional government 
programmes. In being ‘not governmental’, they constituted a ‘space’ in which it was 
possible to think about development and social change in ways that would not be likely 
through government programmes (Mitlin, Hickey, & Bebbington, 2007). 
More so, central to the alternative development approaches were the dual concepts of 
participation and empowerment: participation being the need to build a central role of 
ordinary people in decision making, while empowerment represented a shift from 
viewing poverty as simply a lack of material resources towards a view of poverty as an 
outcome of unequal power relations. These concepts, advanced by academics among 
whom are a US activist Arnstein (1969), have informed a large part of civil society 
engagements with governments and in development. Therefore, beyond service 
delivery (Roy, Raquib, & Sarker, 2017), civil society organisations have played an 
important role to engender rights-based approaches that can strengthen the voices of 
people who find themselves excluded from policy and political process. 
3. CHAPTER 3: UGANDA’S POLITICAL CONTEXT – THE EMERGENCE AND 
SUSTENANCE OF A SEMI-DOMINANT NEO-PATRIMONIAL STATE 
This section illuminates some key aspects of Uganda’s political history and context, the 
nature of political settlements, and the emergence of a semi-dominant neo-patrimonial 
state. I delineate the key characteristics of this context and the relationship between the 
state and civil society. It follows from this contextual exposition that an argument for 
collaborative techniques as the most viable advocacy strategies for civil society 
organizations working in similar contexts is laid out. 
In Working with the Grain: Integrating Governance and Growth in Development 
Strategies,  Levy (2014) provides an instructive typology1 to distinguish among different 
                                                          
1The typology provides a framework for distinguishing between political and governance contexts and 
understanding the nature of political settlements.  
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country governance types and contexts. The typology distinguishes among six different 
country governance types whose characteristics are provided in a table below: 
Table 1: Characteristics of Different Country Governance Contexts 
No. Country Context Main Characteristics 
1.  Conflict  Country is trapped in endemic, violent conflict. 
2.  Dominant discretionary There is strong political leadership (perhaps military or civilian, organised 
around a political party or charismatic individual) which has successfully 
consolidated its grip on power, but formal institutions remain weak, so rule is 
personalised. 
3.  Rule-by-law dominant Institutions are more impersonal but political control remains monopolised. 
4.  Personalised-competitive Politics is competitive, but the rules of the game governing both the polity and 
the economy remain personalised 
5.  Rule-of-law competitive The political and economic rules have become more impersonal – though 
some other necessary aspects of democratic sustainability have not yet been 
achieved. 
6.  Sustainable democracy The country has built a sustainable platform for sustainable democracy 
Source: Adopted from Brian Levy: Working with the Grain: Integrating Governance and Growth in Development Strategies 
Uganda can be located between the personalized-competitive and dominant-
discretionary spaces. This characterization is instructive in understanding Uganda’s 
political context as well as the nature of relationship between the state and non-state 
actors. To understand this characterization, it is imperative to briefly look at some of the 
historic political and economic aspects of Uganda’s polity.  
Firstly, the National Resistance Movement (NRM)2 under the leadership of Gen. Yoweri 
Kaguta Museveni took over power following a protracted guerrilla war that lasted a 
period of five years from 1981 to 1986. This was preceded by almost two decades of 
political turmoil from the mid-1960s (Sejjaaka, 2004). These political conflicts had led to 
dysfunctional state institutions and mistrust of the state by the citizens (Southall, 1980), 
which partially3 explains Museveni’s motive in pursuing decentralization – to foster 
participatory democracy at grass roots level (NRM-O, ; Okidi & Guloba, 2006). It should 
also be noted that prior to the guerrilla war, Museveni’s political party then, the Uganda 
Patriotic Movement, had lost the elections, acquiring just one parliamentary seat (Tall, 
1982; Willis, Lynch, & Cheeseman, 2017). Decentralization was thus a political strategy 
to muster political support that was necessary for consolidating its fragile power base. 
                                                          
2 The National Resistance is the Political Party in Power in Uganda, It’s Chairperson, Gen. Yoweri Kaguta 
Museveni has been at the helm of the country’s political leadership from January 1986 to date.  
3 The other explanations are the reform programs adopted by the NRM including: liberalization and 
privatization were supported by the international financial institutions  
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Institutionally, decentralization reform is one of the many democratic innovations that 
were offered by the country’s 1995 Constitution. These reforms galvanized both 
domestic and international political support for the NRM, were rated to be exceptional in 
terms of transfer of power and praised as one of the most far reaching local government 
reforms in the developing world (Francis & James, 2003), and ceded power to sub-
national governments on the assumption that such reforms would strengthen good 
governance ethos (Mawhood, 1983).  
It is indubitable that, looked at in relation to the periods before and immediately after 
1986, the first years of the NRM registered significant economic and political progress 
(Magaju, 1996); for example, Uganda in the 1990s registered one of the highest 
economic growth rates on the African continent (Ssewanyana, Matovu, & Twimukye, 
2011; Young, C., 2001). It can be argued however that Uganda made this progress, not 
because of the qualitative impersonal institutions and rules, but rather, a leader who had 
the potential to use clientelism and patronage to provide political goods. This system 
was deepened by the goodwill and popular support of majority of Ugandans who had 
gotten tired of the oppression of previous leaders. 
In spite of the legal progress therefore, the system continues to facilitate the informal 
power of presidentialism (Kjaer, 1999), unaccountability, and patronage (Carbone, 
2003; Green, E., 2010; Tangri & Mwenda, 2006). This is reflected in the 1995 Ugandan 
constitution which gives the president far reaching powers to appoint heads of all 
government commissions, security agencies, government ministries and departments, 
judicial officers, and members of the electoral commission. This leaves him with 
overarching control over all the government institutions and departments which 
facilitates patronage. One can argue that parliament provides oversight with these 
appointments, however, with over 70% majority in parliament, President Museveni 
controls the institution (Kjaer, 1999) which compromises its independence.  
More so, in spite of the progress that was made, there are clear discrepancies between 
the commitments and pronouncements. For instance, there was a ban on political party 
activities for almost 20 years (Kasfir, 1998), yet even with the return to multiparty politics 
through a referendum in 2005, the effectiveness of political parties still remains 
challenging: political parties remain weak, and the rules governing their operations are 
overly constraining and personalized (Makara, 2010). The institutional practice restricts 
the freedom of association and expression (Tabaire, 2007), mitigates opposition, and 
consolidates President Museveni’s power (Tangri, 2006). Quite often the operations of 
political parties are constrained by Uganda Police, and government continuously 
harasses opposition politicians (Dicklitch, 1996) and constrains financial mobilization by 
opposition political parties.  
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Additionally, it is imperative to recall that to create a broad-based government when 
NRM came to power, it adopted a co-optation strategy through the use of state 
patronage. Today, Museveni continues to create new constituencies and political 
positions (Green, E., 2010) to accommodate his patronage network. One of the most 
recent expressions of the president’s use of patronage for political survival is in 
appointment of the former president of the Uganda Federal Alliance4, an opposition 
political party, to a ministerial position. Beyond appointments, President Museveni 
continuously uses public funds to run his political campaigns (Helle & Rakner, 2013; 
Imaka & Otage, 2014; Kalinaki, 2014) and compromise politicians into serving his 
political interests (Nganda, 2017; Nsubuga, 2018). The use of public resources for 
political legitimization is thus an apparent feature in the country’s political settlements.  
Lastly, clientelism is another domineering feature of Uganda’s polity. There are growing 
sentiments that Museveni surrounds himself with people along the same tribal line. He 
has continuously recruited from Western Uganda, which is his tribal area. This has 
created high levels of mistrust between some of the tribes of Uganda, and tribalism is 
becoming a major factor in Uganda’s political life (Buwembo, 1998).  
What the preceding analysis demonstrates is the elusive promise and narrative of the 
democratic state in Uganda. It shows that while Uganda has organized regular elections 
since the promulgation of the 1995 constitution, the rules governing elections, political 
and economic activities are personalized, and associational life is severely constrained. 
Because of the overarching intent of President Museveni and the NRM government is to 
maintain political control, regressive actions are often taken to constrain any civic 
actions that threaten the fundamental power of the NRM, while maintaining the 
institutional illusion of democracy. These contextual realities fulfil all the characteristics 
of a semi–dominant neo-patrimonial context; there is strong political leadership, a hybrid 
of military and civilian, organised around a political party which has successfully 
consolidated its grip on power, yet formal institutions remain weak, and so rule is 
personalised (Levy, 2014). This is the context with in which the two case studies are 
presented, demonstrating strategies for achieving advocacy results in such contexts.  
4. CHAPTER 4: HISTORY OF CIVIL SOCIETY ADVOCACY IN UGANDA AND 
RELATIONSHIP WITH THE STATE 
To narrow down the conceptual exploration of civil society and lay foundation for the 
empirical work in chapters 6 and 7, I discuss the emergence of civil society in Uganda, 
its characteristics, and the mutation from predominantly service-delivery to advocacy. I 
                                                          
4 President Museveni appointed, Hon. Betty Kamya who was formerly the president of the Uganda 
Federal Alliance, an Opposition Political Party to a ministerial position. 
11 | P a g e  
 
also explore how this change in focus shaped the relationship between the state and 
civil society sector in Uganda.  
During the colonial period, civil society groups in form of churches and missionary 
societies were the principal providers of basic social services in Uganda. Till today, 
NGOs continue to deliver social services (Barr, Fafchamps, & Owens, 2005; Kaleeba et 
al., 1997) to majority of citizens in Uganda and provide humanitarian aid to victims of 
instability in some parts of the country, especially the North and North-eastern regions. 
Until recently, it was estimated that CSOs, and mainly Faith Based Organisations, 
provided up to 40% of health services in the country (Nyamugasira, 2000). Since the 
mid-1990s however, there has been an emergence of advocacy organisations working 
on governance and accountability. One of the key reasons for this shift is the fact that 
NGOs realised that the way they had been approaching development achieved limited 
results (Larok, 2018). Their work was likened to patching up wounds without addressing 
the root causes of the problem (Nyamugasira, 2000). This realisation precipitated a shift 
in focus of many CSOs to governance, accountability, and advocacy work. The late 
Warren Nyamugasira, one of the civil society icons in Uganda provides a fair analysis;  
“We have come to the sad realization that, although we have achieved many … successes, the systems 
and structures that determine power and resource allocations – locally, nationally and globally, remain 
largely outside our sphere of influence.”  Warren Nyamugasira. 
More succinctly, CSOs have shifted from being loose associations during the pre-
independence and immediate post-independence period, to aid organizations providing 
humanitarian support to victims of war and disaster in the early 1980s and 1990s, and 
now the emergence of advocacy and accountability organizations engaging in activities 
to balance the power between citizens and the state. Beyond thematic shifts, the Civil 
Society Sector in Uganda has also grown in terms of numbers; official government 
figures indicate that Uganda had 94 registered NGOs in 1988; 7,000 by the end of 
2007; 10.0000 by 2010 and 13,000 in 2016 (National Bureau for NGOs).  This growth in 
numbers has also come with emergence of different types of NGOs engaging differently 
with the state. 
Because these shifts have an analytical impact on the relationship between civil society 
and the state, and certainly have an effect on the advocacy strategies adopted by civil 
society organizations, it makes for conceptual importance to distinguish between civil 
society organisations that are explicitly advocacy oriented and those that pursue other 
agendas (Lang, 2012) such as service delivery, if we are to understand their 
relationship with the Government and how these organizations impact Uganda’s polity. 
Service delivery NGOs, for example, augment government service delivery efforts and 
fill the gaps where Government cannot reach. For their complementary role, the 
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Government is supportive and welcoming to these kinds of organisations. The only 
complication in their relationship could be the fact that they compete for the same 
resources from international financial institutions and donors. The fact that Service 
NGOs have the effect of reducing official aid to Government, as international donors 
look to NGOs as alternative channels, does not endear them to Government. In 2012, 
for example, following a widely publicised (BBC, 2012; Redfern, 2012; The Guardian, 
2012) corruption report in the Office of the Prime Minister, the United Kingdom withdrew 
its support  to government and channelled it through NGOs. Moreover, for neo-
patrimonial contexts, the threat of political mobilisation and empowerment from 
providing social services to the population may also threaten the Government’s grip on 
power, and yield conflict between the state and civil society actors.  
On the other hand, advocacy NGOs provide a counter weight to the power of the 
political executives (Bratton, 1989a) and balance the power between citizens and the 
state. Some of these organisations include human rights-based organisations, anti-
corruption activist societies, and governance-focused organisations. These 
organisations check state excesses and challenge its inefficiencies. It is unsurprising 
therefore that in neo-patrimonial contexts where the state works towards maintaining 
political control, it is suspicious of advocacy and governance organisations, which often 
yields conflictual relationships. 
In the final analysis, I do argue that the nature of Government-CSO relationship 
depends on both the political context, nature of political settlements, focus of the civil 
society organisations, and the advocacy strategies adopted. The more confident the 
Government is of its grip on power, the less the fear of civil society; the less fragile the 
Government’s sense of political legitimacy is, the less permissive it will be of advocacy 
organisations (Bratton, 1989a). As such, the amount of space allowed for civil society 
operations in any context is dependent on political risk, threat posed by the NGO, and 
the ongoing nature of political settlements. The chart below builds on the earlier 
distinction of different political contexts. It highlights a synthesis of the nature of 
relationship between CSOs and Government, depending on the focus of the 
organisations.  
13 | P a g e  
 
Table 2: Delineating Country Context Vs Type of NGO 
 
4.1. Changes in Relationship Due to Changes in CSO Engagements 
Overtime 
More critically, in the context of the empirical work for this paper, there are four critical 
periods of time and junctures in Uganda’s politics and contexts that shaped Government 
– CSO Relationships and the nature of legislations in the past three decades. As I 
reveal in the later chapters of this paper, at each of these moments there are critical 
events that shaped civil society advocacy response and strategies to influence the 
proposed Government legislations.  
Firstly, (i) between 1989 and 1999, Uganda was recovering from the 1980 – 1986 civil 
war and the NRM government viewed CSOs as partners in recovery and development 
efforts, the relationship between CSOs and Government was cordial and positive; (ii) in 
the early and mid - 2000s, CSOs realized that the way they had been approaching 
development achieved limited results, as such, they started engaging in advocacy and 
became more involved in political processes, mobilizing citizens to participate in 
governance processes such as the campaign against the removal of term limits from the 
Constitution of the Republic of Uganda in 2004/5; (iii) between 2010 and 2013, a series 
of highly defining events took place — the first is the 2011 general elections, which was 
succeeded by a series of mass citizen protests (the “walk to work” protests) across 
Cell  Service Delivery  Advocacy  
Conflict  CSOs perform most of the service delivery 
functions and fill service delivery gaps. 
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competitive 
Impersonal Institutional Laws, CSOs perform 
their mandates in a mutually agreed 
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Sustainable 
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major towns in the country, and the second is the Black Monday Movement, an anti-
corruption campaign that was jointly driven by a number of Civil Society Organizations 
and bred a series of confrontations between Government and civil society actors; lastly, 
for this paper, (iv) the events that took place between 2014 and 2015 — learning from 
efforts towards monitoring Uganda’s elections under multi-party dispensation since 
2006, NGOs engaged in the campaign for electoral and constitutional reforms called the 
‘Free and Fair Elections Campaign’ (I return to this in finer details in the second case 
study in chapter 7). These events had a defining effect on the nature of relations 
between the NGO sector and Government of Uganda; during each of these periods, the 
Government responded with a new piece of legislation to control NGO operations.  
It is imperative to note, however, that while I state that during the first period (between 
1989 and 1999) the relationship between NGOs and the Government was ‘cordial and 
positive’ (Maghela, 2018; Nassali, 2017), there are other views that contest this 
analysis. Maghela (2018), for example, argues that because the country was emerging 
from a guerrilla war (between 1980 and 1986) that had brought the current NRM 
government, and because NGOs were instrumental in the recovery programs and 
providing humanitarian relief to victims of conflict in some parts of the country, 
Museveni’s government in some way viewed NGOs as partners. That the Government 
recognized NGOs’ contribution to the development and economic recovery process, 
and had no major desire to control their operations, which was manifest in the 1989 
NGO Statute5.  
The contesting view, however, is that, given that the NRM government came into power 
as a rebel movement using the “people power” dynamic, they were always afraid that 
the same dynamics could lead to their fall. In the places where they operated, they were 
supported by a number of NGOs with food and medicine. Within the rebel thinking 
therefore, Ssewakiryanga (2018) and Larok (2018) argue that NRM government found 
CSOs, especially the Humanitarian NGOs, very helpful; and as such, its dominant and 
enduring thinking coming into government was that NGOs are capable of doing the 
same favor — facilitate, resource, and support a similar rebel group against their 
government. In a sense, therefore, there has never been a smooth relationship between 
NGOs and Government.  
It is my view, however, that this does not discount the fact that the CSO-State 
relationship was a smooth one during this base period. Ssewakiryanga (2018) for 
example recognizes that what could have contributed to the smooth relationship during 
this period was mostly around the Movement System of Government which centralized 
consensus politics and nation building ideology. In this framework, NGOs were brought 
                                                          
5 The 1989 NGO Statute was considered by many actors as facilitative of NGOs, whilst it was not fully 
developed to provide from a broad framework for CSO operations, it was not legally constraining.  
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into the mix not only as development actors but also as the quasi opposition — due to 
the fact that the movement system didn’t have opposition. Secondly, with multiparty 
politics banned, effectively muzzling opposition political parties, CSOs were one of the 
few channels through which citizen expression happened (Larok, 2018). In a sense 
therefore, one can argue that CSOs had a smooth relationship with Government, not for 
being predominantly service delivery partners, but rather for the fact that they were 
being exploited to legitimize the movement system of government. It would therefore be 
inaccurate to posit that the Government liked CSOs since Museveni’s government 
believed that CSOs have the capacity to support another rebel movement, which 
partially explains the placement of CSOs under the Ministry of Internal Affairs and not 
any development ministry of government. Nonetheless, it is indeed correct to say that 
the relationship between CSOs and Government was a smooth one. In the much 
broader analysis therefore, the inclusion of this period is important for a couple of 
reasons; firstly, to provide an analytical baseline for tracing the NGO Legislative 
Advocacy in the subsequent focus periods, and secondly, to bring to bear the 
relationship between the form of ideas that CSOs work on and the Government’s 
response in Uganda’s neopatrimonialism context.  
5. CHAPTER 5: CIVIL SOCIETY ADVOCACY STRATEGIES, WHAT DO WE 
CURRENTLY KNOW? 
There is limited consensus on the definition of the term advocacy. Scholars such as 
(Scott, 1983) have defined it as a process of using power to influence the institutional 
rules that define the character of the institutions’ operational environment, or the act of 
influencing or supporting a policy. The common factor being ‘to influence’ (Steinberg, 
Walter W Powell Richard, 2006) the decisions of any institutional elite on behalf of 
collective interest. Beyond influence, (Young, E. & Quinn, 2012) define policy advocacy 
as the process of negotiating and mediating dialogue through which decision makers 
accept the ideas and act upon them. It involves defending causes of others and 
speaking out for policy changes and actions that would address the causes of problems 
confronted in development (Lindenberg & Bryant, 2001), and give voice6 to the majority 
(Almog-Bar & Schmid, 2014). These two broad definitional areas – that is influence and 
negotiation, provide a working definition for this paper. I define civil society advocacy as 
a negotiation process that seeks to define and influence changes in the status quo for 
the betterment of society. This process can be in form of round table debates, exertion 
of pressure on the political system and structures of power through political mobilization, 
generation of new knowledge and ideas that shape public discourse, popular protest 
                                                          
6See World Bank (2004). World Bank Development Report, 2004: Making Services Work for the 
Poor Washington. DC. World Bank and Oxford University Press 
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against undesirable conditions, among others.  In this section, I will explore the existing 
theories and discourse around civil society advocacy strategies. 
To understand civil society effectiveness in advocacy, and the strategies adopted by 
civil society organizations, it is imperative to situate the analysis in the relationship 
between stakeholders involved, especially the state and those outside of the state, and 
the form and substance of advocacy ideas. These facets quite often determine the 
nature of approach and strategy used by civil society actors in the quest to influence 
political processes. In some cases, organizations operate independently or against the 
state, which raises questions about their legitimacy and agenda. In other cases and 
contexts, organizations implicitly or explicitly challenge the state; for instance, by 
demonstrating an alternative vision of development and exposing the limitations of the 
status quo (Bratton, 1989b). Such cases have provided pivot for post development 
critics such as (Lewis & Kanji, 2009) to argue that Civil Society Organizations, 
specifically NGOs, represent a continuation of colonial missionary traditions and act as 
handmaiden of capitalist destruction of non-western societies. He referred to them as a 
‘Trojan horse’ which transfers western capitalist values into communities. This has 
threatened many African states, some of which have quite often worked to undermine 
the efforts of these organizations.  
This particular criticism is important, especially given the contest within which this paper 
addresses the question of space for civil society operation. The Government of Uganda, 
through its agents has variously (ActionAid Uganda, 2012; Opondo, 2017) dismissed 
civil society reform efforts as foreign agendas. However, with the advancements in 
networks and increased interaction between the state and civil society actors, coupled 
with visible increments in the democratization of states across the African continent, 
opportunities for civil society to work together with governments to advance 
accountability and give voice to the poor and vulnerable communities have begun to 
emerge.  
5.1. Some Key Strategies 
Having provided context to this section, this section looks at the existing literature on 
civil society advocacy strategies. While there is varied literature documenting civil 
society advocacy and accountability efforts (Encarnación, 2000; Fox, 2001; Price, 2003; 
Scholte, 2004), not enough is synthesized to delineate strategies that are ‘better fit’ in 
different contexts. Most of the available research and literature on civil society 
engagements is often commissioned and funded by individual organizations and is 
specific to projects and programs. Other literature presents lessons by senior civil 
society activists and NGO advisors such as Green (2016), who have been generous to 
document their experiences. This paper will therefore lay out a few synthesized 
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strategies used by civil society organizations in advocacy, without losing sight of the fact 
that different contexts will require different approaches.  
The chart below presents a synthesized comparison between the two major advocacy 
strategies — collaboration and confrontation — and the tactics involved in each of the 
strategies. The chart also shows any areas of convergence between the strategies. 
Perhaps it is important to distinguish between advocacy strategies and tactics. 
According to Berry (2015), a “strategy is a general, long-range approach to advocacy 
whereas tactics are a set of actions taken to advance a specific strategy7”.  
Chart: Civil Society Advocacy Strategies and Tactics  
In a three-dimensional model 
of NGO advocacy, five 
particular advocacy strategies 
are highlighted:- networking, 
mass movement, public 
support, confrontation and 
collaboration  (Dechalert, 
1999). The strategies that 
span a number of case 
studies and literature I have 
surveyed in preparing for this 
research are: inside 
techniques, direct 
confrontation and 
collaboration. My focus will 
be on collaboration and confrontational strategies due to the fact that the empirical work 
undertaken in this research brings to bear the effectiveness and shortcomings of these 
strategies in semi-dominant neo-patrimonial political contexts. 
More so, Berry (2003) categorizes advocacy strategies and their tactics into two; the 
first is what he calls the aggressive confrontational, which involves tactics such as 
testifying on hearings, protests, among others; the other is the less aggressive and 
cooperative forms of interaction, which involves collaborative forms of interaction and 
tactics such as working in planning and advisory groups, joining teams of government 
resource persons, socializing informally with government officials, responding to 
requests of information, and developing personal relationships with government 
officials.   
                                                          
7 Modified by author for emphasis 
Author's representation of textual descriptions 
 
 
Meetings 
Consultations 
Advocacy Strategies and Their Tactics 
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There is a tendency for CSOs to operate outside the existing political and bureaucratic 
structures — to build citizens’ agency through organization and mobilization in an 
attempt to achieve advocacy objectives. In Thailand, for example, local NGOs in the 
early and mid-1997 provided organizational support and resources to organize protests 
on behalf of the poor (Covey, 1995; Korten, 1990). Protests thus became an important 
feature of Thai NGO advocacy work, and public rallies against government became 
common place. This approach usually adopts strategies like networking, building 
coalitions with likeminded NGOs, citizens, and media campaigns, among others. It 
involves building citizens’ ‘power within’ (Green, D., 2016) to generate momentum for 
change upwards.  
In a study, documenting strategies of CSOs in Nepal, lobbying, policy dialogues, protest 
programs to a complete shutdown were used to advance their agenda. Silpakar (2012) 
argues however, that only some of the advocacy campaigns have been successful in 
effectively influencing policies. He further argues that when CSOs opt for complete 
shutdown, especially in circumstances when their voice is not heard by the state, the 
desired policy influence is easily addressed. The preference for protest and complete 
shutdown is augmented by the thinking that accountability is best enforced from outside 
the established political system and the state. In such contexts, mass dissatisfaction 
amongst the general populace about the status quo is a necessary condition. These 
conditions may make it risky for the political elite not to respond to the demands and 
proposals raised by organized citizen formations and organizations, but do not 
guarantee success. The case studies presented in the next section demonstrate that 
this strategy often breeds suspicion and confrontation between the citizens, their 
organizations, and the duty bearers. Furthermore, due to the extreme imbalance of 
power between citizens and the state, it compromises chances of achieving results. I 
therefore postulate that this approach may only be effective in countries where 
accountability institutions and systems such as those that administer justice and 
management of elections are impersonal, functional and independent. 
The other contrasting key strategy in this paper involves collaborative techniques. This 
is where organizations invite government agencies, policy makers, politicians, and other 
key stakeholders as partners to address some of the policy and service delivery 
deficiencies. In this way, organizations involve these stakeholders in the planning and 
implementation of the activities and programs. This often creates reciprocal 
relationships of trust between organizations, service providers, citizens, and duty 
bearers. Sometimes NGOs establish these collaborative relationships through the 
provision of social services. Collaborative strategies also create a platform for 
community organizing and mobilization (Carol, 1992) and partnerships through service 
delivery later mutate into opportunities for collaborative policy formulation and 
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implementation. They also guarantee smooth implementation of organizations’ activities 
without resistance from target institutions and invested stakeholders. 
One of the techniques used in this strategy involves ‘insider techniques’, or ‘working 
from within’ which refers to where organizations, or their leaders, position themselves as 
experts and avail their resources to government policy makers. They form part of focus 
groups, teams of experts and commissions of inquiry. With these established 
relationships, NGOs are able to express their dissatisfaction about deficiencies in ways 
that are simultaneous with the established government practice and structure. It also 
gives them a platform for constant and continuous engagement with key policy makers 
in government and opens up opportunities to argue for particular reform ideas and 
proposals that are central to their agenda. This strategy is reflected in the NGO 
Legislation Advocacy Case Study in the next chapter: NGO Actors were part of the 
team of experts to develop the NGO Legislations, 2016.  With this strategy, however, 
organization leaders and actors stand a risk of being branded as ‘sell-outs’, especially in 
political systems that are characterized by strong political patronage.  
Relatedly, in a book based on papers and discussions in a seminar on the theme 
‘Democracy at Work in South Africa: The role of organizations in promoting an Open 
Society’, Van Der Merwe (1980) differentiates between two distinct strategies adopted 
by civil society actors in apartheid South Africa, i.e. Gradualism and confrontationalism. 
In their thematic breakdown, they argue that there was a continual, and sometimes 
acrimonious, debate on the question of gradualism vs confrontation strategies. Many 
actors felt that any compromise on matters of principle would jeopardize real change by 
seeming to accept an unacceptable system. On the other hand, a certain group argued 
that, given the prevailing situation, change could only be achieved by gradually 
“chipping away” at the edifice of apartheid and creating situations where concessions 
became the norm. The “confrotationalists” however, believed that the “gradualists” were 
actually harming their cause while the gradualists believed that the confrontationalists 
were keeping issues in the public eye and that there was room for both approaches in 
the change process.  
6. CHAPTER 6: CASE STUDY I: THE NGO LEGISLATIVE ADVOCACY 
PROCESS 
6.1. Introduction 
This case study looks at the tactics used by civil society in their attempt to influence 
NGO legislations at different points in history. The case study traces civil society 
engagements from as early as 2000 to as recent as 2016. It is imperative to note that 
the NGO legislation process has taken different shapes at different points in Uganda’s 
history, and over the past couple of decades. It is not surprising, therefore, that civil 
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society advocacy efforts to influence the legislations have also mutated through different 
characters and employed different strategies at different points in this history. In this 
section, I present both an analytic and narrative story of civil society advocacy on NGO 
Legislations in Uganda. I trace this process across four different periods of time and 
underscore critical moments and junctures in Uganda’s politics and contexts that 
shaped Government – CSO relationships, and the nature of legislations. In each of 
these moments, I also identify critical events that shaped civil society advocacy 
response and strategies to influence the proposed government legislations.  
Table 1 below presents a summary of the narrative. The main hypothesis is that 
collaborative and confrontational advocacy approaches by civil society have different 
prospects of success. More succinctly, in semi-authoritarian political contexts, where 
civil society is relatively powerless, change cannot be achieved through ways that are 
contradictory and conflictual to the interests of a dominant regime: therefore, 
collaborative incremental changes are preferable, and more effective than 
confrontational change options; the more collaborative civil society engagement is, the 
larger the scope and extent of incremental change is likely to be. 
The table reveals that where NGOs used more collaborative advocacy techniques, the 
ideas and changes advocated for were largely adopted by Government. The ease with 
which Government adopted the ideas and proposals also largely depended on the 
packaging of the ideas. Where the ideas were packaged in a more fundamentally 
challenging way, government actors rejected those proposals, but where ideas were 
presented in a non-threatening manner, government actors accepted reform proposals 
with ease. 
From the table, I present a detailed account of the narrative in four distinct but 
interrelated parts (presented as rows). These four parts are linked to a comprehensive 
analysis of Uganda’s political context in sections 3 and 4 of this paper – underscoring a 
broader view of Uganda’s polity and politics. Critically, and more succinctly, the 
narrative traces the NGO legislation process across four periods in Uganda’s political 
history, i.e. (i) the base period — between 1987 and 1999 — when Uganda was 
recovering from the 1980 – 1986 civil war; (ii) the early and mid - 2000s; (iii) between 
2009 and 2013; and lastly, for this case study, (iv) the period between 2014 and 2016. 
As indicated before, there were critical events during these periods that had a defining 
effect on the nature of relationship between the NGO sector and the Government of 
Uganda.  During each of these periods, the Government responded with a new piece of 
legislation to control NGO operations as highlighted in the second column of the table. 
The strategy adopted in the NGO response to the Government’s proposed legislations, 
and the packaging of their ideas had a determining effect on whether they were 
successful or not. 
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Table 3: NGO Legislative Advocacy Process Traced 
 
Key hypothesis: collaborative vs confrontational approaches by NGOs have different prospects for success. 
 
Key Period Key Moments and NGO Response NGO Strategy Content of NGO 
Proposals 
Packaging of 
NGO Proposals 
Consequence  
2000 - 2005 (NGOs realize 
that the way they have 
been approaching 
development achieves 
limited results, begin to 
engage in more political 
process). 
 
Government introduces amendment to the 
1989 NGO Statute. NGOs petition 
Parliament to drop the Bill, challenge the bill 
with Ministry of Internal Affairs. 
Confrontational  Highly 
threatening 
Fundamentally 
challenging 
NGO Defeat: Bill 
is passed amidst 
protest. 
2006 – 2009 (NGOs 
become more political as 
they engage in election 
monitoring) 
Government passes the NGO Bill, 2006. 
NGOs mobilize to challenge the Bill in 
constitutional court, organize protest match 
to the constitutional court. 
 
Confrontational  Highly 
threatening 
Fundamentally 
challenging 
 
NGO Defeat: 
Effort to repeal 
the Bill fails. 
2009 – 2013 (a series of 
highly-defining events 
including the launch of the 
Black Monday campaign 
take place) 
Government embarks on the process of 
developing the NGO Policy 2010. NGOs 
participate in consultations to develop the 
policy, organize meeting to draft policy. 
 
Mixed Highly 
threatening 
Easing Mostly NGO 
success: Rules 
agreed 
collaboratively.  
2014 – 2016 (NGOs 
engage in the Campaign 
for Electoral and 
Constitutional Reforms. 
Government introduces the NGO Bill, 2015. 
NGOs convene meetings with MIA and the 
Parliamentary Committee on Defense and 
Internal Affairs, organize retreats to input 
into the Bill. 
 
Collaborative Highly 
threatening 
Easing Mostly NGO 
success: Most 
NGO proposals 
are adopted. 
NGOs join a team of experts to develop 
NGO Regulations, organize joint 
(Government and NGOs) drafting retreats 
and countrywide consultations. 
 
Collaborative Somewhat 
threatening 
Easing NGO Success: 
Regulations 
agreed 
collaboratively.  
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6.2. What Happened – an In-depth Look 
This section presents a detailed and descriptive account for the summary depictions in 
the table 1 above, and the motivations behind them. The subsections are classified 
according to the different periods represented by the four different rows in the table.   
6.2.1. 2000 - 2005, Government Introduces Amendments to the 1989 NGO 
Statute: Confrontational NGO Strategy and Highly Threatening Ideas 
“This is how we want to be legislated, and this is the bill,” Peter Magehela.8 
As indicated in the introductory paragraphs of this section, in the early 2000s, CSOs 
realized that the way they had been approaching development achieved limited results. 
As such, CSOs started engaging in advocacy and became more engaged in political 
processes and mobilization of citizens to balance the power between citizens and their 
leaders. When this approach was detected, government responded by introducing 
reforms to the 1989 NGO Statute that ushered in ways to control CSO operations.  
When the first amendments to the 1989 NGO Statute were proposed, NGOs, under 
various coordination mechanisms and platforms — including the Coalition on the NGO 
Bill (CONOB)9 and the Uganda National NGO Forum — did analysis of the proposed 
Amendment Bill, lobbied Parliament, and held meetings with the Ministry of Internal 
Affairs in an attempt to challenge the proposed Bill. Throughout these engagements, the 
NGOs attempted a parallel confrontational approach (Tumwine, 2018); instead of in-
putting into the proposed Amendment Bill, they focused on ensuring that ‘if they do not 
get a good law, at least they should prevent the proposed Bill from being passed by 
parliament (Larok, 2018; Tumwine, 2018). A lot of the engagements, therefore, were 
more about, “this is the kind of law we need” (Maghela, 2018) and less about adjusting 
and improving the proposed government Bill. Some of the Human Rights Organisations 
also petitioned parliament asking the Committee of Defence and Internal Affairs, which 
was considering the Government Bill, to drop it (Maghela, 2018). Parliament however 
declined to drop the Bill (Musoke, 2002) and instead asked the organisations to appear 
before it. In spite of this request from the committee handling the bill, NGOs chose not 
to appear before it to present their proposals. 
The refusal by NGOs to contribute to the government process brings to bare their 
confrontational stance as far as engaging with the bill is concerned. It is not surprising 
                                                          
8 Peter Maghela is the Program Director at Chapter IV Uganda, a Ugandan Civil Society Organization. He 
was among the team of Civil Society Resource Persons engaged in the advocacy process 
9 Members of the coalition include; Uganda Debt Network (UDN), Community Development Resource 
Network (CDRN), Anti-Corruption Coalition Uganda (ACCU), Human Rights Network Uganda (HURINET-
U), Development Network of Indigenous Voluntary Associations (DENIVA),Uganda Women's Network 
(UWONET), Uganda National NGO Forum (UNNGOF),Transparency International (TI) 
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therefore that during the interviews, respondents revealed that, following frustrations 
with Government ignoring their analysis and the little progress registered (Larok, 2018), 
NGOs concentrated on promoting the idea of an Alternative Bill under the auspices of 
Coalition on the NGO Bill (CONOB). The idea was to show Government exactly the kind 
of law they needed, and subsequently put pressure on Government to adopt it 
(Tumwine, 2018) in place of the Government Bill. 
As NGOs embarked on the idea of developing an alternative Bill, the Government 
continued with the process of drafting theirs, ignoring the NGOs, which dragged on until 
2006 when it was finally passed amidst protests from NGOs. It is not clear why the 
Government and the Parliament of Uganda took this long to finally pass the Bill. My 
observation is that given the critical occurrences throughout this period, and the sudden 
change in the focus of some NGOs from predominantly service delivery to advocacy, 
Government was using the notion of introducing a restrictive law to intimidate NGOs 
and get them ‘in line’. When this did not happen — especially with NGOs becoming 
more active in challenging the proposed amendment of the Constitution of the Republic 
of Uganda to remove Presidential Term limits and refusing to engage in a parliamentary 
process to improve the Bill — the Government felt the need to re-introduce the Bill in 
2004. The timing of the Bill’s resurfacing  augments the assertion that these campaigns 
had alienated the president, who consequently responded by ordering (Larok, 2018) the 
reintroduction of the NGO Bill.  
At this phase, NGOs reignited their previous engagements using similar confrontational 
strategies. NGOs organised meetings with the Ministry of Internal Affairs but focused 
more on promoting their Alternative Bill and pushing for Government to adopt it. This 
was opposed to engaging with the amendment process to influence the outcome of the 
Government Bill. According to Mr. Peter Maghela, the parallel nature of the process 
adopted by NGOs partly explains the failures of this advocacy initiative (Maghela, 
2018). Larok (2018) augments Maghela’s assertion, adding that NGO requests during 
the meetings with the Ministry of Internal Affairs and government stakeholders were 
diametrically opposed to the content of the bill and would fundamentally alter the 
character of the proposed Government Bill, effectively threatening the political 
establishment. 
The alternative Bill was shared with the Government, but it was not considered and did 
not prevent, or meaningfully change, the character of the final NGO Act that was passed 
in April 2006, under questionable circumstances, and amidst protests from NGOs. My 
inquiry into why parliament hastily passed the bill revealed that the President had 
ordered the immediate passing (Larok, 2018; Maghela, 2018; Tumwine, 2018) of the 
Bill. It is reported that on top of friction caused by NGOs actively engaging in the 
campaign against the removal of term limits, President Museveni had been rattled by a 
report (DEMGROUP, 2006) produced by a local election monitoring group — the 
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Democracy Monitoring Group10 — which generated evidence of electoral malpractices 
that was used by Dr. Kiiza Besigye to challenge the results of February 2006 General 
Elections in the Supreme Court. In a meeting at the president’s home in Rwakitura, 
President Museveni is reported to have asked about the proposed legislation to ‘control’ 
NGOs (Larok, 2018), and specifically requested that it is passed immediately.  
It is my contention that if civil society had engaged with Parliament and the Ministry of 
Internal Affairs through collaborative rather than confrontational means, some, if not all, 
the proposals of NGOs would have been adopted. As we shall see in the subsequent 
subsections, where civil society worked collaboratively with Parliament and the Ministry 
of Internal Affairs in a similar process (2015-2016), most of their proposals were 
adopted.  
6.2.2. 2006 – 2009, Government passes the NGO Bill, 2006, NGOs mobilize to 
challenge the Bill in Constitutional Court, organize protest match to the 
constitutional court — a continuation of confrontational NGO approach 
and highly threatening ideas: 
When the Bill was finally passed in April 2006, NGO’s response was double-fold. (i) 
There was a section of NGOs which focused on mobilizing to challenge the law in the 
constitutional court, in essence deepening the confrontational lines between NGOs and 
the Government: the constitutional court challenge was based on the fact that the Bill 
that was passed infringed on rights to assemble and freedom of expression, provided 
for a restrictive licensing regime, and was considered regressive —an argument that 
was raised during the advocacy process. (ii) The other section of NGO actors felt that 
they needed to adjust and comply with the provisions of the ‘New Law’, effectively 
accepting the regressive provisions of the law. 
According to the respondents for this research, the duality of response to the “New” Act 
from the NGO sector was due to the diversity of the NGO sector itself (Maghela, 2018; 
Tumwine, 2018). Those who chose the confrontational route11 — through the 
constitutional challenge — were predominantly advocacy NGOs, whereas service 
delivery NGOs believed that they could work within the existing ‘restrictive’ context. 
Further analysis of the responses from the interviews conducted revealed that beyond 
the divide between Service Delivery and Advocacy NGOs, there were clear divergences 
on questions of the appropriate strategy (Larok, 2018; Sewakiryanga, 2018). There are 
                                                          
10 Democracy Monitoring Group (DEMGroup) is a consortium of four civil society organizations that came 
together to contribute to a freer, fairer, transparent and credible elections landscape in Uganda. The 
members of DEMGroup are Uganda Joint Christian Council (UJCC), Action for Development (ACFODE), 
Transparency International Uganda (TIU), and the Centre for Democratic Governance (CDG). The main 
goal of DEMGroup is to foster free, fair and transparent elections in accordance with National, Regional 
and International standards 
11 The NGOs that petitioned court were majorly human rights and advocacy NGOs including; Uganda 
National NGO Forum, Human Rights Network, Foundation for Human Rights Initiative 
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some NGO leaders who believed that due to the nature of the political system in 
Uganda, challenging the Bill, and by extension the Government, would not achieve 
results; they believed that the best strategy would be to potentially work with 
Government to improve it incrementally.  
On the other hand, determination to challenge the law and deepen confrontation with 
the system and the Government was revealed more in the second court challenge, 
following the publication of a list of NGOs to submit information to the NGO Board within 
a short period of time or be de-registered. Instead of complying, civil society actors 
decided to challenge the directive in the Courts of Law. This directive was challenged 
on two grounds: (i) freedom of expression, and (ii) the fact that the law which was being 
applied had been challenged in the constitutional court.  
Predictably, the confrontational approach failed. Court dismissed the civil society 
application in 2016. This constitutional court challenge provided an excellent display of 
President Museveni’s control over state institutions, as highlighted in the preliminary 
sections of this paper; a classic characteristic of Semi-Dominant Neo-Patrimonial States 
in which this research is situated. The court, which was petitioned in 2007, never sat 
through to 2009, and when it finally sat to consider the matter (Maghela, 2018; 
Tumwine, 2018), it took around two more years for the Attorney General to provide the 
Government’s response. The court never sat again until 2016 when it dismissed the 
matter on the grounds that the case had been overtaken by events. 
6.2.3. 2009 – 2013: Government Embarks on the Process of Developing the 
NGO Policy 2010 – NGOs Learn from the Past, Mixed Strategy 
Engagement on the NGO Policy 
Around the time of the court cases, the Government embarked on the NGO Policy 
Amendment Process. The NGO engagement with this process was championed by the 
same NGOs that were leading advocacy against the NGO Bill, 2005. This means that 
the changes in strategy were not due to changes in the actors involved in the process 
but rather as a result of other factors. It is imperative to also underscore that a 
government policy is an executive document, therefore the process of engagement is 
more closed than the process for the Bill. While Parliament is obliged to consult with the 
stakeholder when considering a Bill before it, policies are executive documents and 
governments are not obliged to consult. In spite of this, government procured a 
consultant who conducted consultations with stakeholders. It is not clear why 
government procured a consultant to lead the process, rather than government staff, 
however respondents for this paper (Larok, 2018; Tumwine, 2018) indicated that it could 
be explained by the fact that it was a requirement by donors supporting the process. 
Even when the consultations took place, they were too structured to deliver the desired 
outcome. Nonetheless, NGOs decided to participate in the consultations and make their 
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input. It is still unclear at this point as to what prompted NGOs to change their strategy 
and agree to engage in the consultations, the most plausible explanation is that they 
realised from their previous engagements that collaboration would achieve better results 
that confrontation.  
When the draft policy was published, it was considered by most sections of the NGO 
fraternity as relatively better than the 2006 NGO Law. A number of issues and concerns 
of the NGO sector were addressed in the final text (Larok, 2018; Maghela, 2018; 
Tumwine, 2018) of the policy and adjustments were made to the satisfaction of the 
NGOs. Some respondents (Sewakiryanga, 2018) attributed this success and 
improvement to the fact that NGOs engaged collaboratively with government in 
developing the NGO Policy and were willing to make compromises in order to have 
most of their concerns addressed. According to Mr. Arthur Larok, this collaboration was 
made possible by fact that the government agency responsible for developing the policy 
was the Office of the Prime Minister (Larok, 2018), unlike previous engagements with 
the NGO Act, 2006 which were led by the Ministry of Internal Affairs. The Office of the 
Prime Minister was willing to engage with NGOs in a collaborative process.  
While this argument places responsiveness of the responsible government agency at 
the center of success rather than the strategy adopted, it can only be true to an extent; it 
does not explain the demand side factor, such as the change in civil society strategy 
and the willingness to make compromises and accept incremental gains. It is imperative 
to recall that in the first phase of the amendment, the committee of parliament invited 
civil society actors for consultations and to make their input in the Bill. Unlike the 
engagement on the policy, the parliament call was rejected by civil society (Maghela, 
2018; Tumwine, 2018). It is therefore logical to conclude that civil society registered 
success due to their approach to advocacy on the policy development process. More 
directly, there are those among the respondents (Maghela, 2018; Sewakiryanga, 2018) 
who clearly argue that the collaborative strategies used by NGOs were effective in 
achieving results.  
When the policy was finally published in 2010, government justified the need for a new 
law to match the NGO Policy, 2010. A closer look at the events that characterised the 
period between 2010 and 2013 when a draft Bill was leaked (Tumwine, 2018) to the 
general public, coupled with an  a comprehensive analysis of the content, reveals that 
the government’s justification for a new law might have been simply an excuse. The 
tone of the Bill revealed that it was intended to control rather than regulate NGOs, which 
is opposed to the spirit of the Policy. To understand this assertion, one needs to look at 
the events characterising the period in question (2010 – 2013) highlighted earlier. 
During this period a series of highly defining events took place: the first was the highly 
anticipated 2011 general elections which was succeeded by a series of ‘walk to work’ 
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protests across major towns in the country; the second is the launch of the anti-
corruption campaign — the Black Monday Campaign — spearheaded by a number of 
Civil Society Organizations and Actors. These actions by the wider Civil Society Sector 
were in my view the trigger for the process of developing a new NGO law to control the 
sector.  
This process of developing a new Bill was initiated by cabinet around 2011. It was 
secretive, and information was highly guarded (Tumwine, 2018). It is unclear why 
government was covertly introducing the Bill, however, some government actors 
involved, who agreed to an interview on condition of anonymity, revealed that the 
President Museveni did not want any diversions that would compromise his 2011 
election campaigns. This process went on until 2015 when the Bill was finally gazetted 
on 10thApril 2015. It is at this point in the civil society legislative advocacy process that 
the NGOs adopted more collaborative strategies. 
6.2.4. 2014 – 2016; Government Introduces the NGO Bill, 2015, NGOs Engages 
More Collaboratively 
Following the publication of the proposed NGO Bill, 2015 in April 2015, NGOs held a 
series of meetings to discuss how they would engage with the process. As indicated 
earlier, the Bill was considered by NGOs as regressive and an attempt by the state to 
constrain NGO operations in the country (Mwesigwa, 2015; Okuda, 2015; Ssekika, 
2015). It is imperative to note that, learning from events monitoring Uganda’s elections 
under multi-party dispensations since 2006, NGOs had engaged in the campaign for 
electoral reforms called the Free and Fair Elections Campaign between 2013 and 2015. 
This campaign had led to clashes between the government and the NGO sector, with 
the government purveying the narrative that NGOs were engaging in political and 
‘subversive’ activities. This was also reflected in the tone of the Bill which as NGOs 
variously argued (Okuda, 2015; UNNGOF, 2015), was littered with regressive 
provisions that would further constrain NGO operations. 
Similar to response on the NGO Act, 2006, in the second phase of this narrative, at the 
first NGO Leaders meeting to consider collective response to the Bill, there was a clear 
revelation of divergence in approach and strategy on how to engage with the New Bill. 
There are those actors who believed in a more collaborative process contending that 
past confrontational engagements had yielded limited results12. It is imperative to note 
that this was the fourth time in almost 15 years that NGOs were engaging with an NGO 
legislative process and as such, learning lessons from previous engagements, this 
group of NGO leaders believed that working collaboratively with key actors in the 
                                                          
12 The most vocal proponents of this view were; Ugandan National NGO Forum (UNNGOF), Human 
Rights Network (HURINET), Network of Indigenous Voluntary Associations (DENIVA), Uganda Women's 
Network (UWONET), ActionAid – Uganda, all of whom were involved in the previous engagements.  
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legislative process and designing targeted messages to key institutions such as 
Parliament, the Ministry of Internal Affairs, and the NGO Board would go a long way in 
ensuring that NGO concerns with the Bill were addressed. Some of the actors in the 
Civil Society Coalition for Oil (CSCO)13 also shared their very successful (Imaka, 2012) 
collaborative process in the advocacy on the Petroleum (Exploration, Development and 
Production) Bill, 2012 which Munabi (2018) believes contributed to the decision to adopt 
a collaborative strategy. There had also been several informal bilateral meetings with 
key government stakeholders involved the process (Sewakiryanga, 2018) which were a 
precursor to a collaborative process.  
On the other hand, those who preferred a confrontational approach14 argued that 
President Museveni’s government had become openly repressive and was not 
committed to the preservation and protection of citizens’ rights. This group believed in a 
more confrontational and or challenging approach, given the nature of the NRM 
Government, the tone15 of the bill, and the relationship between the NGO sector and the 
Government (Sewakiryanga, 2018).  They argued that drawing clear “battle lines” would 
be the more appropriate strategy to use; there was no point to think about meaningful 
engagement, after all, the then Minister of Internal Affairs, the late Hon. Aronda 
Nyakairima, a military general and former army commander of the Uganda People’s 
Defense Forces had also tried to isolate NGOs from the process (Tumwine, 2018) and 
was playing divisive politics in the sector. As such, they believed that NGOs had to 
“either win or the government wins” (Larok, 2018), an outcome that could not be 
achieved with collaborative strategies. 
Ultimately, the ‘learning from the past’ argument carried the day; NGOs chose a 
collaborative approach. To do this, four complementary processes and collaborative 
strategies were undertaken. (i) appeal to the logical sense of members of parliament 
through research, argumentation, and debate; (ii) recruit allies within Parliament and the 
Committee of Defense and Internal Affairs with whom to work and improve the Bill (iii) 
engage with the Minister of Internal Affairs (Government) and the technical staff at the 
NGO Board to collaboratively work and make reasonable concessions and agreements 
on the Bill, engage in informal discussions with critical actors involved in the process, 
and then lastly; (iv) engage in public debate to demystify some of the myths and 
narratives that were purveyed by government against the NGO sector. 
                                                          
13 CSCO is a network of more than 40 civil society organizations that aim “to maximize the benefits to 
the people of Uganda from oil and gas discoveries by promoting social, economic and environmental 
sustainability in exploration and production activities. 
14 These were majorly led by Chapter 4 Uganda an independent not-for profit non-partisan organization 
dedicated to the protection of civil liberties and promotion of human rights for all in Uganda and Human 
Rights Awareness and Promotion Forum (HRAPF) 
15The tone of the Bill was believed to be draconian, intrusive and dictatorial and challenging the 
sustenance and independence of the sector. 
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a) Towards a Logical Appeal, the Establishment of an Experts’ Team and the 
CSO Position Paper 
A team of experts was put together to draft documents to use throughout the advocacy 
process. About four different documents were produced: (i) an analysis of the Bill and its 
implications to the NGO sector; (ii) an academic analysis of the Bill targeting the 
members of parliament with a legal background, and the clerks to the committee of 
parliament handling the bill; (iii) contribution of the NGO sector to Uganda’s 
development and an imperative for a facilitative law, and; (iv) clause by clause analysis 
and the alternative text of the bill16 which was used for engagement with the Committee 
on Defence and Internal Affairs and the Minister. 
To counter the negative narrative about NGOs engaging in subversive activities, civil 
society actors developed a CSO Position Paper on the Bill. The position paper was 
prepared for the general public and emphasised and underscored the contribution of the 
NGO sector to Uganda’s development. This decision was very critical in the advocacy 
process. As a strategy, NGOs focussed on appealing to the legislators on the 
Committee of Defence and Internal Affairs and the general public with the contribution 
of the sector, in essence arguing that NGOs, and CSOs in general, are not a threat to 
the state like the government sought to suggest, but rather partners in development. 
The tone of the position paper in many respects guided the actors involved towards a 
collaborative strategy. The paper delineated the contribution of NGOs to Uganda’s 
development and extrapolated the view that NGOs are development partners (economic 
argument) with government but not challengers of the state. Ssewakiryanga (2018) 
believes that the tone of this paper, and the advancement of this narrative, in many 
respects changed the disposition of many state actors towards CSOs.  
b) Engagements with the Minister and Parliament: Small Gains and Beginning 
of Mutual Compromises. 
Being a Government Bill, the Minister had a lot of power over the nature of the Bill. 
Therefore, NGOs met with the Minister to convince him about what is desirable. These 
meetings were convened through NGO leaders who had personal relationships with the 
Minister. They were organised in the form of dialogues and spaces where honest and 
open conversations would be held. During these meetings, NGO leaders shared their 
concerns with the proposed Bill and the imperative for a facilitative law for NGOs in 
Uganda. A few concessions were made at the ministerial level, the least of which was 
the need for a new NGO law; one that does not seek to control, but rather regulates the 
NGO Sector. The Minister had publicly and privately argued that some NGOs were 
exploiting the public and thus the need to control them, this shift in attitude was 
                                                          
16This is not the same as the alternative bill referred to earlier but rather a different text based on the 
provisions in the bill 
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therefore an important step towards progressive engagement. The Minister agreed (if 
not in action but in principle) that NGOs need not be controlled but rather regulated. 
What remained to be agreed upon was how this regulation would happen. 
The engagement with parliament happened in three different ways. The first one is the 
formal retreats with MPs on the Committee of Defence and Internal Affairs. These were 
formal engagements to argue for the proposals of the NGO sector to improve the Bill. 
The other form of engagement was the informal interactions with some members of 
parliament who advised on which ideas may pass and which ones may not, depending 
on the interactions they had had with the Minister and other government stakeholders. 
This way, NGOs understood how to design their proposals and ideas in ways that were 
not fundamentally threatening to government actors. The third form of engagements 
with Parliament were one-on-one interactions with the technical and drafts team of the 
Committee on Defence and Internal Affairs. Through these engagements, alternative 
provisions were discussed and presented for consideration. Most of the engagements 
with this group of actors were informal and based on established personal relationships. 
It is through these strategies that most of the proposals of NGOs were adopted by the 
committee of parliament handling the bill.  
To understand this strategy broadly, and the extent to which the NGOs had decided not 
to be confrontational in their engagement process, it is imperative to present the 
discussions following the drafting of the final report for the committee of defence and 
internal affairs.  After collecting the views from all the stakeholders, the committee 
drafted their final report to the house of parliament for consideration, according to the 
formal parliamentary procedure. Most of the concerns and ideas from the NGO sector 
were addressed and adopted and made part of the committee report. Civil society 
actors had already made allies with some MPs on the committee who were considered 
to be inclined towards the civil society throughout the engagements. After finalisation of 
the report, these MPs had two options; the first was to draft a minority report which 
would be presented on the floor of parliament for consideration, and the second was to 
endorse the majority report and engage further in the bigger house debate. Civil society 
and the MPs chose the latter. This way, it revealed a perspicuous intention of working 
together with Government, and the Ministry of Internal Affairs in particular.  
It is imperative to note that civil society engaged with the formal process of coming up 
with the final Act. For example, when Government called for views on the Bill, about 30 
NGOs submitted their memoranda before the committee. Beyond the formal process, 
like earlier indicated, NGOs engaged with both parliamentary and government actors 
informally (Sewakiryanga, 2018). One of the most outstanding displays of this informal 
engagement was during the house debate on the report of the committee. Some of the 
technical members of the NGO sector were allowed access to parliament through the 
Office of the Leader of Opposition and played a key role in providing research and 
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information to members of parliament during the debates in the house. Copies of their 
research were given to MPs indiscriminately to spread information among MPs as much 
as possible. Having space in the parliamentary building also gave an opportunity to the 
NGO team to follow debate and generate real time information to counter some of the 
narratives that had been advanced by some members of government. The Bill was 
passed by Parliament with over 70% of NGO recommendations and proposals. 
6.2.5. NGOs Join a Team of Experts to Develop NGO Regulations, 
Collaborative Strategies Deepened  
During the same period (2014 – 2016) NGOs worked closely with government and state 
agencies. In Parliament for example, NGOs supported the identification and facilitation 
of a research assistant attached to one of the Members of Parliament who was on the 
Committee on Defence and Internal Affairs. This not only gave NGOs an opportunity to 
acquire information about everything that went on in Parliament, and in the committee 
meetings in particular, but also a platform to make their arguments consistently heard 
by the committee. More so, and strategically, NGOs identified and worked closely with 
the clerk to the committee, who was very supportive of the arguments of NGOs. Given 
his role in drafting and writing the committee report, he ensured that the arguments and 
position of NGOs became part of the final committee report.  
Respondents for this paper believed that on the whole, NGOs achieved more than 
before with their advocacy on the NGO Bill, 2015. There was no contention on what 
success should have looked like17. NGOs had made an array of proposals to improve 
the Bill. On average, majority of NGO concerns with the Bill were addressed, and about 
70% of NGO recommendations and proposals were adopted by Parliament and 
incorporated into the final Bill. This level of success is greater than any other process 
that was undertaken with all the past laws.  
To operationalise the Act, S. 55 (1) of the Act provides that the Minister may, after 
consultations with the National Bureau for NGOs make regulations for giving full effect 
to the Act. It is imperative to underscore the fact that regulations are an important part of 
the NGO regulatory framework, they provide for the operational details of the laws. If 
‘progressively’ drafted, regulations go a long way in creating a conducive environment 
for NGOs. As such, leveraging on alliances created during the law-making process, 
NGOs agreed with the NGO Board and the Minster of Internal Affairs to jointly develop 
and draft the regulations. A joint expert team comprising of four members18 from 
                                                          
17 Success meant that civil society proposals are taken up by government and parliament and that their 
concerns with the bill are addressed. 
18 Representatives of government on the technical team included; Stephen Okello, the interim executive 
director of the National Bureau for NGOs, Alex Byaruhanga, a legal officer from the office of the Attorney 
General among others. 
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government, and four19 representatives of civil society, was appointed by the Minister 
and tasked with the responsibility of developing regulations. It is not yet clear how this 
agreement was reached, but respondents for this paper attributed it to informal 
conversations that took place between some civil society leaders and the bureaucrats at 
the NGO Board. This was a major shift from the previous adversarial relationship where 
the Government was on the opposite side of NGOs to having both the Government and 
NGOs in one room to develop regulations.  
Retreats were organised to draft the regulations, during which a series of debates took 
place. I was personally involved in some of these debates: it was clear that government 
actors had strong beliefs about some of the issues being discussed, while civil society 
representatives also held firm on some proposals. What was beautiful about this 
process was that debate was internal and all the actors involved considered themselves 
as part of the same team. On some of the contentious provisions, debates would go 
through the night until consensus was reached. When the final product (regulations) 
came out, it was jointly owned by the experts’ team and it was subjected to countrywide 
stakeholder consultations. Throughout all these consultations, the expert’s team moved 
together to present their product and spoke with a common voice regardless of their 
distinctions. The regulations came out and were adopted by Parliament. It is widely 
believed that the regulations are ‘progressive’ and addressed civil society concerns. 
6.3. Conclusion 
It can be observed from the narrative above that NGO engagement with the 2015 NGO 
Bill that NGOs advanced the positive and collaborative lens in the amendment process. 
The empirical work demonstrates that the more than 70% of the civil society proposals 
were accepted and passed by Parliament, and that 80% of the civil society concerns 
were addressed. It is my argument that this success was a result of the collaborative 
strategies adopted by NGO actors. By welcoming the idea of amending the existing law, 
it allowed government stakeholders the flexibility to work with them to develop and or 
improve the Bill. They however argued that the draft Bill was littered with problematic 
clauses that undermine the very essence of the proposed law. Unlike engagements in 
the earlier periods, NGOs where were unwilling to work with government to improve the 
proposed law and were not willing to compromise on some of the principles which 
blocked any channels of negotiation — like previously indicated, the packaging of ideas 
advanced fundamentally challenged the government Bill (Larok, 2018) which alienated 
government officials who ignored their proposals. With the 2015 engagements, NGOs 
were willing to make some concessions and win some proposals. This is synonymous 
                                                          
19 Representatives of civil society on the committee included; Peter Maghela, from Chapter IV Uganda, 
Barbara Nambi from Human Rights Centre Uganda, Patrick Tumwine from Human Rights Network and a 
representative from the Uganda National NGO Forum who alternated between Job Kiija and Chris 
Nkwatsibwe 
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with incremental methods of progress proposed by Andrews (2013). This way, 
government actors feel less threatened and are willing to make some compromises.  
It is imperative to note that the NGO Act, 2016, and the NGO Regulations, 2017 are the 
most progressive set of NGO legislations Uganda has ever had, both in letter and spirit. 
This was made possible by NGO engagement with the legislative process. The 
originally proposed Government Bill was very regressive and contained provisions that 
would legally constrain NGO operations.  
That said, it would be wrong for one to assume that since NGOs made gains with the 
NGO legislation of 2016, that in some way this translates to a better operating 
environment for NGOs in Uganda. Far from that, the macro operating environment for 
NGOs has remained the same since the passing of the NGO Act, 2016. The 
Government of Uganda has remained increasingly repressive and continues to extra-
judicially shrink the operating space for civil society (ActionAid, 2017; The Observer, 
2017). 
This condition is due to the fact that the character of the NGO operating environment is 
a function of the broader politics of Uganda (Larok, 2009). Museveni’s government has 
variously operated outside of the existing legal provisions to constrain any perceived 
opposition and threat to his grip of power. There is sufficient evidence (Oloka-Onyango 
& Ahikire, 2016) of openly misapplying and or ignoring the law to meet his political 
goals. This, however, does not discount the progress made with the NGO Act, 2016. 
Suffice to note that the advocacy engagement was a legal reform campaign: 
understandably changes that were envisioned fell within the ambit of the form and 
character of legislation, which while central to shaping the character of the macro 
operating environment are not in themselves sufficient guarantees for a conducive 
environment for NGOs.  
It is possible for a critic to argue that changes in Uganda’s political context might have 
contributed to the shifts that happened and results achieved in the latter period. To 
control for this, I will delineate a case study of an initiative for constitutional reform 
implemented during the same period of time — the Free and Fair Elections Campaign, 
which was coordinated by a coalition of civil society organisations in Uganda. 
7. CHAPTER 7: CASE STUDY II: THE FREE AND FAIR ELECTIONS CAMPAIGN 
 
7.1. Introduction 
This case study looks at the strategies adopted by civil society actors across the 
different phases of the campaign for Free and Fair Elections, which undertook to 
influence election management legislations and cause constitutional reforms. The 
Campaign for Free and Fair Elections (the FFE Campaign), which was undertaken 
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between February 2014 to June 2015, was conceived at a time following successive 
periods of monitoring Uganda’s elections under multiparty electoral system, by NGOs in 
Uganda since 2006. The overall goal of the campaign was to develop and cause the 
enactment constitutional and electoral reforms that would guarantee free, fair, and 
transparent elections in Uganda. The idea was to generate momentum towards a 
national consensus on the nature and substance of constitutional and electoral reforms 
for the Parliament and Government of Uganda to enact. The campaign was coordinated 
by a coalition of Uganda’s civil society organisations who worked closely with some key 
political party leaders. 
The key argument in this section is that where NGO actors collaborated with NRM 
political party members and government actors in the design and implementation of the 
campaign activities, that stage of the campaign was successful. What Table 2 below 
presents is a tracing of the campaign across three specific phases: (I) the first phase is 
the public rallies on free and fair elections which registered mostly failure; (ii) the second 
phase is the nation-wide regional consultations on free and fair elections, which were 
mostly successful, and lastly; (iii) the national consultation and post consultation 
engagements. 
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Table 2: Electoral Reform Advocacy: The Free and Fair Elections Campaign 
 
Key hypothesis: collaborative vs confrontational approaches by NGOs have different prospects for success; the ease 
with which success is achieved also depends on the packaging of ideas. 
 
Key Period Key Moments and NGO Response NGO Strategy Content of NGO 
Proposals 
Packaging of 
NGO Proposals 
Consequence  
(February to June 2014) 
Public Rallies 
The Uganda Police Force disrupts the public 
rallies and meetings and NGOs and political 
parties seek dialogue with the Uganda 
Police Force. 
Confrontational  Highly threatening Fundamentally 
challenging 
National consensus on 
reforms not generated, 
NRM and Government 
isolated from the 
process. 
(August to November 
2014) Nation-wide 
Regional Consultations  
NGOs take lead in the organizing of regional 
consultations, involve NRM and state actors 
in the planning and execution of the 
consultations. Rules of engagement agreed 
to more collaboratively.  
Collaborative Highly threatening Easing and 
unifying 
message 
National bi-partisan 
consensus on the 
nature and substance 
of electoral reforms 
generated. 
(November to December 
2014) National 
Consultations and Post 
Consultations 
Engagements  
Political leaders purvey an anti-government 
narrative. Ideas around mass protest begin 
to emerge. The NRM snubs the national 
consultations.  
 
Confrontational  Highly threatening Fundamentally 
challenging 
Failed bi-partisan 
consensus on how to 
take forward the 
reforms. 
(December 2014 – June 
2015) 
Government introduces the Constitutional 
Amendment Bill, 2016. NGOs present the 
FFE Compact as a National Consensus on 
the nature and substance of electoral 
reforms. 
Confrontational High threatening Fundamentally 
Challenging 
Mostly civil society 
failure: none of the 
civil society proposals 
are adopted. 
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7.2. What Happened – a Closer Look into the Campaign 
As a background to this campaign, a series of civil society leaders’ strategy meetings 
and discussions were held on how civil society can contribute to the transformation of 
their country (Okello, 2018), having come to the realisation that the effectiveness of the 
civil society sector is intricately linked to the nature of the county’s politics. One of the 
most notable meetings took place at a hotel in Kampala and attracted civil society 
leaders from different organisations and parts of the country. In that meeting, it was 
resolved that civil society organisations needed to pull together and organise strategic 
advocacy on key governance issues (Munabi, 2018; Okello, 2018). All the campaigns 
were undergirded by the fact that the citizen is central and as such the overarching 
philosophy would be to organise and mobilise citizens to generate pressure on the 
political elite (Okello, 2018) in the country to enact key governance reforms. 
Accordingly, a list of 13 campaigns were designed including; the Black Monday 
Campaign, the Campaign for Land Reform, Access to Decent Education Campaign, 
Access to Decent Health Care, and the Free and Fair Elections Campaign, among 
others.  
Civil Society Organisations under the auspices of the Uganda Governance and 
Monitoring Platform had been implementing a project called the Citizens’ Manifesto 
Initiative from 2009. They had realised that developing content alone was not enough 
(Larok, 2018; Nkwatsibwe, 2016), and that a significant part of the problem is the 
electoral laws that facilitate the nature of the processes through which the citizens elect 
their representatives.  
It is this background that informed the decision by civil society organisations, specifically 
Non-Government Organisations, to work with political parties to push for electoral 
reforms. A meeting between key political party leaders and NGO leaders was held in 
February 2014 to discuss the possibility of a joint campaign. This relationship between 
NGOs and political parties was brokered by Bishop Zac Niringiye20, through a series of 
negotiations and meetings. It is from this meeting that the joint campaign called the Free 
and Fair Elections Campaign was birthed. It is imperative to note, however, that there 
were previous efforts led by opposition political parties and leaders to push for electoral 
reforms in Uganda especially under the auspices of various political outfits. Those 
efforts are beyond the scope of this research. The major focus of this paper is the Civil 
Society lead campaign that took place between 2014 and 2016 
7.2.1. February – June 2018: The Public Rallies – Political Mobilisation to 
Generate National Momentum – Confrontational Strategies  
                                                          
20 Bishop Zac Niringiye is a Ugandan clergyman and political activist. He was involved in the campaign for 
free and fair elections and brokered the relationship between NGOs and Political Party Leaders 
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The public rallies were organised between February and June 2014; they formed the 
first phase of the campaign. The rallies attracted mainly opposition political leaders and 
key civil society leaders who moved around the country popularising the need and 
demand for electoral reforms. These public rallies attracted thousands of Ugandans 
who gathered in open spaces to listen to political and civic leaders articulate and 
popularise the need for reforms. Typically, characteristic of political rallies, the meetings 
were organised in open fields and the message delivered was designed to arouse 
emotion and chants from the audience. The message was more around, ‘let’s throw this 
government out’ (Munabi, 2018) because it cannot organise and deliver a credible 
election. The argument for this message was that it would be naïve to expect credible 
constitutional reforms and later on credible elections under the NRM government. This 
alienated most government actors and induced a negative reaction from the Uganda 
Police Force. Uganda Police responded by dispersing and disrupting the meetings 
(Nassali, 2017; Okello, 2018; Tumushabe, 2018) under the cover of the Public Order 
and Management Act, 2010.  
Munabi (2018) believes that the interruption by the police was more about fear from 
what could come out of those rallies — a form of anti-government revolt, given that the 
message that was purveyed by the political leaders at the rallies was anti-government. 
This observation is consistent with what Mr. Godber Tumushabe21 calls the fear of 
public gatherings by the Museveni regime. Tumushabe (2018) argues that since the 
time of the walk to work protests in Uganda (referred to earlier in the preliminary 
chapters), and the Arab Spring wave that rocked most of North Africa, the NRM 
government has been suspicious and scared of public gatherings and meetings. This is 
augmented by my earlier observation that civil society organizations’ support had been 
critical to Museveni’s rebellion effort and entry into Government (1980-1986), and that it 
is his empirical knowledge and understanding of its potency that grounds his fear of 
civic organization. 
The police disruptions of the public rallies were a very critical juncture in the FFE 
Campaign. The actors learned lessons which were applied in the design of regional 
consultations. It is imperative to note that, following a series of disruptions, the 
campaign leaders sought an audience with the leadership of the Uganda Police Force 
for a dialogue. The Leader of Opposition in Parliament raised the issue on the floor of 
parliament, causing the Speaker to intervene. These meetings discussed a number of 
things including the provisions of the Act that the Inspector General of the Police Force 
claimed to have been implementing. It is following these meetings that the Police 
refrained itself from interrupting the meetings. One of the emerging lessons from the 
meetings and rallies was the importance of collaboration. As I will note later, the 
                                                          
21 Mr. Godber Tumushabe is the Associate Director of the Great Lakes Institute for Strategic Studies 
(GLISS) and was head of the joint secretariat for the Free and Fair Elections Campaign. 
38 | P a g e  
 
regional consultations which formed the second phase of the campaign, invited police 
leadership in the regions to even participate in the consultations, an action that is 
believed mitigated potential disruptions (Okello, 2018).  
Lastly, beyond generating public interest and momentum towards the need for electoral 
reforms in the country, the public rallies were largely ineffectual in ensuring that the 
Parliament of Uganda enacted reforms that would ensure credible elections. The reason 
for this is twofold, (i) the nature of the rallies alienated and isolated NRM government 
actors, who looked at the process as a largely opposition campaign; secondly, and 
relatedly, (ii) the messages and packaging of the ideas advanced at the rallies 
fundamentally challenged the power of the NRM government, specifically the leadership 
of President Museveni. It appeared that the campaign was focused on regime change 
rather than creating a levelled election playing field for all the actors. Given the 
composition of the Ugandan parliament, with the dominance of the NRM, and coupled 
with the fact that the President of Uganda enjoys significant control over most arms of 
government, it was highly unlikely that the reforms would be enacted. 
7.2.2. August – November 2014: Regional Consultations – a Bi-Partisan 
National Consensus Emerges: Collaborative Strategies and Less 
Threatening Packaging of Ideas 
The lessons from the first phase of the campaign were instructive in the design of the 
second phase of the campaign. In this phase of the campaign, NGO Leaders pushed for 
a more inclusive and collaborative process of consultations. It is also at this stage that 
the scepticism of political leaders involved in the organisation of the campaign and 
divergences in strategy began to be revealed. According to Ritah Aciro22, in an interview 
conducted for Nassali (2017), the politicians were uncomfortable with the NGOs’ 
approach of removing confrontation, yet, according to them, it is a model of political 
engagement. As such, unlike public rallies, the regional consultations were organised in 
a more structured and collaborative way.  
Before expounding on how the meetings were organised, it is highly imperative to look 
at a brief analysis of stakeholders at regional level, the power and leverage that these 
stakeholders had over this process. Firstly, the key stakeholders in regional and local 
governments are the citizens, the political leaders/policy makers, local bureaucrats, and 
service providers such as the health centers, schools etc. These form the formal centers 
of responsibility and power in a democratic dispensation. There are however, other 
informal centers of power in the regions, these include; the religious and cultural leaders 
and institutions, business elite and the civil society organizations. These key individuals 
and institutions exist outside the local government structure and leadership but yield 
                                                          
22Ritah Aciro is the Executive Director of the Uganda Women’s Network and was involved in the 
Campaign for Free and Fair Elections. 
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controlling power and influence over the formal governance structures. This is a 
characteristic of neo-patrimonial states in which some real power and decision making 
resides outside the formal institutions(Cammack, 2007). They are linked to the formal 
structures and political leaders by the logic of personal and particularistic interests and 
do yield political power and control.  
The citizens ‘elect’ local councilors, district chairpersons and members of parliament in 
the general elections. They also pay taxes to provide resources for services delivery. 
These are likely to be the two direct ways through which the citizens engage in the 
governance of local governments. The politicians on the other hand make policies and 
appropriate resources for the local bureaucrats and service providers to implement and 
provide services to the citizens. During election time, political candidates often deploy 
the services of religious and cultural leaders, and some members of the business elite 
to muster political support for their electoral bids. In turn, these leaders expect favors in 
terms of local contracts when their preferred candidates go through. They also act as 
links between the political leaders and the citizens and provide information to the 
politicians on citizens’ perceptions and interests. Sometimes these informal actors have 
an influence over the decisions of their political patrons. 
Realising these power dynamics at the regional level, the organisers of the campaign 
made sure to organise the regional consultative meetings as inclusively and 
collaboratively as possible. The goal was to create regional consensus on the nature of 
reforms that would feed into the national consensus. The extent of inclusivity of the 
regional meetings was one of the major contentions between some of the leaders of the 
campaign, and another revelation of the divergences in strategy referred to earlier. 
The decision to include the NRM representatives and actors in the consultations, for 
example was one of the controversial issues. Some individuals, majorly opposition 
political party leaders who were part of the national coordination committee which 
provided strategic leadership to the campaign believed that the NRM was the “problem” 
and that their members especially the Resident District Commissioners would disrupt 
the meetings (Okello, 2018) and or challenge some of the ideas that were advanced. 
On the other hand, however, those who believed in the inclusion of the NRM 
representatives believed that such a collaboration would send a message about the 
willingness to collectively engage on issues beyond the change of government 
(Ssewakiryanga, 2018), and give the campaign a national outlook. Ultimately, a decision 
was made to involve and include the NRM district representatives and RDCs in the 
meetings.  
One other important point to note is that and organising mobilising for the regional 
consultations was the responsibility of the ‘regional organising committee,’ which was 
chaired by a local civil society organisation. The regional organising team comprised of 
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a representative from each of the political parties with offices in the region, the Resident 
District Commissioner from the host district, the Regional Police Commander, and a key 
opinion leader in the region. This further insulated the meetings from any form of 
government disruptions and displayed the collaborative intentions of the organisers. 
Lastly, the participation at the regional consultations included about 200 participants 
from across all the districts represented in the region. The categories included the 
religious leaders, representatives of each of the political parties, including the ruling 
National Resistance Movement, Youth and Women Representatives, among others. 
This inclusivity across the political, social, religious and cultural spectrum brought to 
bear the inclusive nature of the process. 
I argue that this was one of the major success factors of the regional consultations. The 
inclusion of the NRM in the meetings gave them a broader sense of inclusivity which 
was lacking in the first phase of the campaign. Secondly, with the NRM government 
actors involved, the regional police leadership, and the district political leaders across 
the political party divide present at the meetings, the Uganda Police Force could not 
disrupt the meetings. As variously argued in different spaces (Acen, 2011; Khisa, 2017; 
Oketch, 2016), the Uganda Police Force, under the leadership of Gen. Kale Kayihura, 
functioned as a partisan organ; it was therefore almost guaranteed that without NRM 
involvement in a political activity that threatens the power of the NRM, Gen. Kayihura 
would order his force to stop the meeting. There are some actors like Tumushabe 
(2018) who believe that the meetings were not interrupted due to the fact that they were 
organised as townhall meetings held in closed halls. But this is not entirely true, as 
Nassali (2017) observes; even in isolated instances where overzealous officers 
attempted to disrupt the meetings, they were constrained by the RDCs and police 
officers who were part of the planning process. This further augments my argument that 
the second phase of the campaign (regional consultations) was successful due to the 
collaborative nature of the process. 
The Design of Ideas Advanced at the Meetings, the Unifying Message! 
“The framing was very critical in organising the regional consultations. The way you frame an issue 
determines whether they will reject you or not,” Patricia Munabi23. 
Beyond the collaborative nature of the process, the form of ideas advanced during the 
consultations was one of the major success factors of the campaign. Because of the 
way the issues discussed were presented during the regional consultations, it was easy 
to generate consensus across the different political persuasions on a common position. 
The content of the meetings was one of rejecting political corruption, reforming the 
electoral commission and electoral laws, and making constitutional amendments that if 
                                                          
23 Ms. Patricia Munabi is the Executive Director of the Forum for Women in Democracy (FOWODE) and 
was a member of the National Coordinating Team for the Campaign. 
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enacted would fundamentally reduce President Museveni’s political control, which 
fundamentally challenges the power of Museveni’s government. In spite of this, the 
message was designed in such a manner that it was less threatening. The issues were 
introduced in an objective way, presented as concerns about the future of the country 
and for posterity (Okello, 2018), mitigated any form of objections and rejections that 
might have ordinarily come from NRM supporters and RDCs. This observation is 
augmented by Munabi (2018) who believes that the inclusive and futuristic design of 
ideas is one of the fundamental reasons the organisers were able to muster buy-in from 
all the critical stakeholders involved (Munabi, 2018). Mr. Leonard Okello further argues 
that the regional forums were successful because the message purveyed at the 
meetings was about reconciliation and a unity amidst diversity (Okello, 2018). 
“The narrative that we are all immigrants in Uganda except for the Batwa, the Karimajong, the Ik and the 
Tepeth, and that it is imperative for us to unite and together confront the challenges the country faces 
disarmed those who would otherwise disrupt the meeting.”  Leonard Okello24 
This is very important because it was also an important development in the relationship 
between political parties and the NGOs. The shift of the focus of the campaign from 
regime change to pushing for reforms to create a level playing ground for political actors 
during electoral process (Ssewakiryanga, 2018) was indubitably one of the major 
success factors of the FFE campaign. 
7.2.3. November – December 2018: National Consultation, NRM Snubs the 
Meeting– emergence of confrontational narratives  
Representatives from each of the categories of participants represented at the regional 
consultations were selected to represent the region at the national consultations in a 
Delegates Conference between 24 and 26 November 2014. The idea of the national 
consultation was to validate and endorse the list of reforms proposed from the regional 
consultations and make commitments to take the reforms forward. While this 
conference was a culmination of regional consultations, organised to give effect to the 
consensus that had been reached from the meetings across the country about the 
nature of constitutional and electoral reforms, the design of the national consultations 
was rather different. 
Firstly, by the time of the national consultations, there was an emergence of tension 
across the political party leadership about how to generate political capital from the 
successful phase of the regional consultations. It is thus unsurprising that mutual 
suspicion had already started developing between actors (Awori in (Nassali, 2017). As 
such, some of the leaders made public and media appearances and re-created an anti-
NRM government narrative. The re-creation of such a narrative was simply an 
                                                          
24 Mr. Leonard Okello is the Chief Executive Officer of the Uhuru Institute and was one of the lead 
facilitators for the regional consultations 
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unintended consequence of attempts at building political capital (Okello, 2018). It also 
emerged that there was no consensus on how to take forward the Citizens’ Compact. 
For political party leaders, sentiments about a mass procession to Parliament’s 
premises to present the compact was one of the options seen to have the potential to 
exert pressure on the system to enact the reforms. It is this combination of a 
confrontational approach and the emergence of an anti-Museveni narrative that I 
believe led to the ‘rejection’ of the outcomes of the process by the state, and the failure 
of this phase of the campaign.  
It is imperative to note that, just like the regional consultations, official invitation letters 
were sent to the national leadership of the NRM and informal contact was made to 
persuade the President, who is also the National Chairperson of the party to participate. 
In spite of this, however, none of the top leadership of the NRM Party showed up for the 
meeting (Kafeero, 2014; Nassali, 2017; Waswa, 2014). Some actors (Munabi, 2018; 
Okello, 2018) attribute this to the tone of the messages that were sent through different 
media platforms by political leaders referred to earlier. Secondly, political leaders had 
started a conversation about what actions they would likely undertake at the national 
consultations to demonstrate the pressure to enact reforms. Given that the meeting 
would be a gathering of more than 1000 citizens from across the country, there were 
suggestions that after endorsing and adopting the reforms, they would move in a 
procession to parliament to deliver the compact. In Uganda’s context, this would be 
considered a protest and would lead to confrontation with the security forces. As such, 
some of the respondents (Munabi, 2018) believe that this attitude could have 
contributed to the NRM staying away from the meeting; in their reasoning, their 
participation would be considered an endorsement of such a demonstration. 
This view is consistent with the argument that the NRM never participated in the 
national consultations because there was a fear that they would be endorsing a certain 
approach and ideas that would make major shifts in Uganda’s polity; shifts that would 
threaten their position. More so, Okello (2018) believes that the NRM declined to attend 
the consultations in spite of the invitation due to the intelligence they had gathered that 
the national consultations were no longer a non-partisan and collaborative space, but 
rather had become a space that advances an opposition agenda. To some extent the 
behaviour of political actors towards the national consultation, highlighted earlier, 
precipitated this sentiment. Opposition leaders had started suggesting that President 
Museveni was a stumbling block to free and fair elections in Uganda. The fact that the 
momentum generated after the national consultation was channelled towards the 
formation of The Democratic Alliance (TDA)25, which brought together opposition 
                                                          
25 The Democratic Alliance was a Coalition of Opposition Political Actors seeking to unseat President 
Museveni 
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political actors to select one candidate to challenge the NRM’s Yoweri Kaguta Museveni 
in the 2016 General elections lends credibility to these sentiments.  
7.2.4. December – June 2015: Post Consultation Engagements: From the 
National Consensus to Actual Reforms – Confrontational Strategies 
“We have moved around the country and collected views from all citizens and this is their wish, ‘you have 
to’ enact the reforms.” Bishop Zac Niringiye 
This statement encapsulates the attitudes of the actors in the Free and Fair Elections 
Campaign, especially during the post consultation phase. This phase of the campaign 
was undergirded by the narrative that a national consensus on the nature and 
substance of constitutional and electoral reforms had been generated and, as such, 
Parliament needed to enact the proposed reforms.  
During this time, the Government of Uganda introduced the Constitutional Amendment 
Bill, No. 1, which proposed a list of electoral and constitutional reforms. The Bill did not, 
however, contain any of the proposals in the Citizens’ Compact, and was considered 
devoid of substance by most actors. As in the case of the 2006 NGO Bill engagement, 
the engagement on this Constitutional Amendment Bill was designed in such a way that 
the promoters of the Citizens’ Compact chose not to engage with the Government Bill 
but rather present the Citizens’ Compact as the alternative that should be considered 
instead. Their argument, which would be legitimate in any functional democratic society, 
was that the Citizens’ Compact was a result of nationwide consultations and 
represented a national consensus. Since members of parliament are representatives of 
the people, they should follow the citizens’ desires. Like I have noted, this did not 
happen. It is imperative to note that even when the team of civil society leaders met with 
the Legal and Parliamentary Affairs Committee of Parliament during the parliamentary 
stakeholder consultations on the Constitutional Amendment Bill, CSO actors only 
presented the compact as an alternative to consider. 
Ultimately, the Constitutional Amendment Bill was passed by Parliament without the 
consideration and incorporation of any of the ideas and proposals in the Citizens’ 
Compact on Free and Fair Elections. The Parliament of Uganda argued that there 
wasn’t sufficient time for the reforms to be enacted (Nassali, 2017), which many actors 
considered as simply an excuse. The Speaker had been asking for reforms for a long 
time and Government only chose to present the reforms at the last minute. More so, it is 
believed that the Compact was not discussed in Parliament due to the fact that the 
issues advanced were not in the interest of Museveni’s government (Munabi, 2018). 
The promoters of the Citizens’ Compact continued the engagement with the media with 
a hope to generate public debate and demand for electoral reforms, a strategy that was 
equally unsuccessful. 
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7.3. Conclusion 
One of the major assumptions of the promoters of the FFE Campaign was a demand 
and supply function of good governance. Believers in this assumption argue that when 
sufficient demand for certain ideas is built amongst the rights holders (citizens), the duty 
bearers (policy makers/political leaders and technocrats) would be obliged and or 
compelled to supply.  
From the onset, however, the organisers were quite aware that because of the context 
within which this campaign was organised, citizens’ pressure alone would not be 
sufficient to lead to substantial reforms in the election management system. The NRM 
government has a firm grip on power and has majority control of parliament. The 
organisers were thus aware that the supply side of good governance and in this 
particular case, the NRM government might not enact the proposed reforms. In spite of 
this awareness, Munabi (2018) argues that the actors were convinced that if there was 
national consensus on the form and substance of the reforms and sufficient pressure 
and demand for reforms was built, Government would in a way bend to the will of the 
citizens.  
This assumption was flawed on two basic grounds, (i) the fact that, as revealed in the 
preliminary sections of this paper, in Uganda’s political context there is strong military 
leadership organised around the National Resistance Movement and dominated by 
President Museveni; formal institutions remain weak, rule is highly personalised, and 
political control remains monopolised by Museveni. Despite the fact that the country has 
a semblance of competitive politics through regular elections, the rules governing both 
the elections and the country’s polity remain personalised; and (ii) the NRM government 
is not disciplined enough to act prudently whenever called upon.  As highlighted earlier 
therefore, reforms were not enacted, the Government ignored the proposals and calls 
for fundamental and comprehensive constitutional and electoral reforms, with 
Parliament arguing that there was no time to enact the reforms, which analysts believe 
was simply deceitful.  
For Munabi (2018), the failure to sustain the momentum and pressure for these reforms 
could have contributed to the failure of the last phase of the campaign. This is 
consistent with what Tumushabe (2018) calls a lack of sufficient and sustained citizens’ 
pressure to induce effective demand for electoral reform. However, a closer analysis 
across all the three phases of the campaign reveals a different narrative. Where the 
organisers worked with and collaborated with the state through the office of the 
Resident District Commissioner, the NRM regional and district offices, and the Uganda 
Police Force, and where they worked with key religious and cultural leaders in the 
regions, that phase of the campaign was successful. Firstly, the town hall meetings 
were not disrupted by the Uganda Police Force, unlike the public rallies in the first 
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phase of the campaign, and there was unanimous regional agreement on the form and 
substance of reforms that were adopted at regional level, in spite of the diversity in 
political persuasion. It should be noted that the reforms proposed at most of the regional 
level consultations were the same as those adopted at the national level. 
Secondly, it is imperative to note that the design and packaging of ideas at the different 
stages of the campaign was an important element of success or failure. The 
presentation of ideas in a manner that does not fundamentally challenge the power of 
the NRM government, made it possible for the NRM representatives in the meetings to 
work with and contribute to the discussions, and later on adopt the regional declarations 
on reforms. The emergence of a challenging narrative towards the national 
consultations however arguably contributed to NRM’s decision to stay away from the 
meeting and ultimately their failure to endorse the reform proposals agreed at the 
national conference.  
It is possible to argue that the centrality of political opposition leaders in the campaign 
might have significantly contributed to the disinterest of the NRM’s top leadership. While 
this argument holds some merit, especially in light of the government – opposition 
relationship in Uganda26, it is imperative to underscore the fact that at the beginning of 
the campaign, the office of the Presidency through the Minister for Presidency had 
written to the leadership of the NRM across the country to engage with the process 
(Nassali, 2017), which partly explains their full participation at the regional meetings. 
What this implies therefore is that the change in attitude might have taken place only 
towards the national consultations.  
Secondly, the success of the regional consultations should demystify this argument. As 
indicated, the regional consultations, like all the other phases of the campaign, were 
jointly organized by a team of civil society and opposition political party actors. The 
distinction was in the fact that the regional consultations involved the NRM 
representatives and other critical state actors in the design and organization of the 
meetings while the other phases did not. More so, the ideas advanced during the 
regional consultations were not fundamentally threatening the power of the NRM 
Government. The organizers and facilitators fashioned the meeting about the future of 
the country and a platform to negotiate a new compact that is inclusive.   
The Impact of the Form and Substance of Reforms Sought 
One of the other issues that came out in the interviews is that the nature of reforms that 
were sought fundamentally challenge the character and power of the state. The main 
goal of the campaign was to develop a compact of reforms that would be enacted into 
                                                          
26 The NRM government has a very confrontational relationship with opposition political parties and 
leaders. Dr. Kizza Besigye who is the four-time challenger of president Yoweri Museveni has been 
variously brutally arrested on trumped up charges for challenging Museveni 
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law. If enacted, it was expected that they would fundamentally alter the political 
landscape in Uganda and balance of power between the citizens and the state. As 
indicated earlier, voting for political leaders and paying taxes are the two direct ways 
through which citizens directly participate in the governance of their countries in 
representative democracies. It was believed that enacting the proposed reforms would 
guarantee that, when citizens cast their votes, they are not only counted by also count. 
Some of the reforms proposed would significantly reduce the powers of the president 
especially in appointing members of the electoral commission and judicial officers.  
Not all was lost… 
In the final analysis, though, in spite the fact that the proposed reforms were not 
enacted, it would be wrong for one to posit that the Free and Fair Elections Campaign 
was a failure. This is not the argument I make in this paper.  Far from what most would 
like to believe, while the campaign may not have made strides in achieving content 
gains, there were process gains that are demonstrably significant in a growing 
democracy like Uganda’s. Firstly, the fact that the campaign was able to galvanise 
citizens around the need for electoral reforms was one of the major successes of the 
campaign. The citizens’ compact on free and fair elections by all measures represents a 
national consensus on the form and substance of constitutional and electoral reforms. 
Secondly, some respondents for this paper, such as Munabi (2018), also believe that 
the citizens’ enthusiasm in the 2016 general elections can be directly linked and 
attributed to the countrywide citizens’ organisation and mobilisation during the 
campaign. There are visible shifts in Uganda’s polity as a result of the campaign, 
Uganda’s citizenry is more aware and engaged in Uganda’s governance processes. 
Nonetheless, this is not what success looked like in the design of the campaign. The 
campaign sought to achieve content gains in form of constitutional and electoral 
reforms. Ultimately, this did not happen. I do argue that the failure to achieve these 
gains is attributed to both the less collaborative strategies adopted during the first and 
later phases of the campaign and the design of ideas that fundamentally challenged the 
power structure of the NRM Government, specifically the top political leadership, 
especially in light of Uganda’s Semi-dominant neo-patrimonial political context.  
8. CHAPTER 8: CONCLUSIONS 
In the final analysis, it can be seen from the evidence presented that where civil society 
organisations and actors used collaborative strategies and techniques in their advocacy, 
they achieved their results and goals. Firstly, the acceptance of their proposals by 
Parliament and the Ministry of Internal Affairs in the process of formulating the NGO Act 
2016 was a result of direct engagements between the civil society actors and key 
government agencies. It became necessary to engage with parliament in “created 
informal” and “invited formal” spaces to negotiate the substance of the NGO Bill 2015. 
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This also became apparent by civil society’s willingness to participate in consultations 
organised by the consultant in the development of the NGO Policy, 2010.  The evidence 
presented shows that more than 70% of NGO Proposals on the NGO Bill, 2015 were 
adopted and ultimately passed by Parliament.  
Collaborative strategies were deepened with the formulation of a joint expert’s team to 
draft the NGO Regulations of 2017. Working collaboratively with Government, gave an 
opportunity to NGO actors to advance positions and make proposals that would not be 
possible operating outside of the system. It is not surprising therefore that the NGO 
regulations are viewed by wide sections of civil society as the most progressive piece of 
NGO legislation.   
One the other hand, where civil society engaged through less collaborative and 
confrontational strategies, they did not achieve results.  The evidence shows that 
engagements in the earlier phases; Between 2000 and 2005, NGOs proposed an 
alternative Bill and were not willing to compromise on some of the principles which 
blocked any channels of negotiation with government actors. The rhetoric around the 
ideas and proposals by civil society also fundamentally challenged the Government, 
which alienated government officials and blocked any channels of negotiation. In 
2006/7, NGOs also organised protests and challenged the NGO Act, 2006 in the courts 
of law – techniques and actions that are consistent with confrontational strategies. Due 
to the nature of Uganda’s polity and politics, with the President having control over 
courts, the Civil Society Organisations lost their cases and did not achieve any 
significant results in influencing the character of NGO legislations.  
The evidence presented in the case study on the Campaign for Free and Fair Elections 
also brings to bare the effectiveness of collaborative strategies of advocacy and the 
inefficiencies of confrontational strategies. The evidence presented shows that the first 
and third phases of the campaign were unsuccessful, evidenced by the disruptions by 
the police and failure to generate national consensus in the first phase of the campaign, 
and the failure to achieve any meaningful reforms in the later phases of the campaign. 
As indicated in the narrative, one of the major assumptions underpinning civil society 
actions in the first and third phases of the campaign was the demand and supply model 
of governance. In their estimation, it was believed that if national consensus on the 
nature and substance of reforms emerged, and sufficient citizen demand for reforms is 
generated, Parliament would enact the reforms. As indicated, this failed. While there 
was consensus on the reforms, Government ignored the proposed reforms and passed 
a Constitutional Amendment Bill that contained none of the citizens’ proposals.  
In contrast, the second phase of the campaign is considered by all the actors to be a 
successful phase. First, state agencies and the police did not disrupt any of the regional 
consultations; secondly, there was national, bi-partisan consensus on the nature and 
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substance of reforms that formed the Citizens Compact on Free and Fair Elections. I 
argue that this success is a result of collaborative approaches that the organisers 
adopted in this phase of the campaign. Civil society actors worked with and collaborated 
with the state through the office of the Resident District Commissioner, the NRM 
regional and district offices, and the Uganda Police Force, in the organisation and 
negotiation of the nature and substance of proposals.  
The empirical work of this study only focuses on actions of civil society in Uganda. 
Whilst the findings can be generalized to contexts that are similar to Uganda’s, they 
may not be valid for civil society in general. This leaves critical possibilities for taking 
this study forward. For instance, a study that looks at various contexts and a wide range 
of case studies for comparison would indubitably add value to the stock of knowledge 
about civil society and civil society advocacy in semi-dominant neo-patrimonial political 
contexts.  
Furthermore, as indicated earlier, the ingredients of a civil society operating 
environment in Uganda go beyond the form and substance of NGO Legislations. It 
would make for good qualitative research to examine the extent to which the civil 
society legal frameworks have an impact on the broader operating environment and 
effectiveness of civil society in semi-dominant, neo-patrimonial contexts.  
Finally, I do hope that this research will inform civil society actors and practitioners 
engaged in advocacy in contexts that are semi-authoritarian. It should be emphasized 
that my preference for collaborative strategies is by no means an endorsement for co-
option. This is one of the major risks, especially in patrimonial contexts where patronage 
is at the center of political settlements. Nonetheless, I believe that civil society actors 
and organizations can maintain their independence while working collaboratively with 
state actors. As such, I believe that if well applied, collaborative techniques can go a 
long way in expanding space for civil society in contexts that are otherwise be 
contracted.  
49 | P a g e  
 
REFERENCES 
 
Acen, C. (2011). Uganda police partisan, unprofessional and brutal - human rights 
activists. London: 
ActionAid. (2017). Why are NGOs being targeted and what lessons can we draw for the 
future?. Kampala: 
ActionAid Uganda. (2012). Museveni lashes civic critics and foreigners, praises oil 
scientists (http://www.oilinuganda.org/features/civil-society/museveni-lashes-civic-
critics-and-foreigners-praises-oil-scientists.html ed.) 
Almog-Bar, M., & Schmid, H. (2014). Advocacy activities of nonprofit human service 
organizations: A critical review SAGE Publications Sage CA: Los Angeles, CA. 
Andrews, M. (2013). The limits of institutional reform in development: Changing rules for 
realistic solutions Cambridge University Press. 
Arnstein, S. R. (1969). A ladder of citizen participation Taylor & Francis. 
Barr, A., Fafchamps, M., & Owens, T. (2005). The governance of non-governmental 
organizations in uganda Elsevier. 
BBC. (2012). UK cuts aid to ugandan government 
Bennett, A. (2010). Process tracing and causal inference 
Bennett, A., & George, A. L. (1997). Process tracing in case study research MacArthur 
Program on Case Studies Washington, DC. 
Bennett, A., & George, A. L. (2005). Case studies and theory development in the social 
sciences 
Berry, J. M. (2003). A voice for nonprofits Brookings Institution Press. 
Berry, J. M. (2015). Lobbying for the people: The political behavior of public interest 
groups Princeton University Press. 
Boulding, C. E. (2010). NGOs and political participation in weak democracies: 
Subnational evidence on protest and voter turnout from bolivia Cambridge 
University Press. doi:10.1017/S0022381609990922 
Bratton, M. (1989a). The politics of government-NGO relations in africa Elsevier. 
Bratton, M. (1989b). The politics of government-NGO relations in africa Elsevier. 
Buwembo, J. (1998). Tribalism resurfaces in ugandan life and politics. Nairobi: 
Cammack, D. (2007). The logic of african neopatrimonialism: What role for donors? 
Wiley Online Library. 
50 | P a g e  
 
Carbone, G. M. (2003). Political parties in a ‘No-party democracy’ hegemony and 
opposition under ‘Movement democracy’in uganda Sage Publications. 
Carroll, T. F. (1992). Intermediary NGOs: The supporting link in grassroots 
development. Kumarian Press. 
Covey, J. G. (1995). Accountability and effectiveness in NGO policy alliances. West 
Sussex: John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. doi:10.1002/jid.3380070605 
Dechalert, P. (1999). NGOs, advocacy and popular protest: A case study of thailand 
(http://www.lse.ac.uk/collections/CCS/publications/ files/82/Dechalert - 1999 - 
NGOs, advocacy and popular protest a case study o.pdf files/83/29094.html ed.) 
DEMGROUP. (2006). Demgroup interim report on the campaigns and other election 
related issues COMTEX News Network, Inc. 
Dicklitch, S. (1996). Uganda: A microcosm of crisis and hope in sub-saharan africa 
SAGE Publications Sage UK: London, England. 
Dicklitch, S. (1998). The elusive promise of NGOs in africa: Lessons from uganda 
Springer. 
Edwards, M., & Hulme, D. (1992). Scaling-up the developmental impact of NGOs: 
Concepts and experiences London: Earthscan. 
Encarnación, O. G. (2000). Tocqueville's missionaries: Civil society advocacy and the 
promotion of democracy JSTOR. 
Fox, J. (2001). Vertically integrated policy monitoring: A tool for civil society policy 
advocacy Sage Publications Sage CA: Thousand Oaks, CA. 
Francis, P., & James, R. (2003). Balancing rural poverty reduction and citizen 
participation: The contradictions of uganda’s decentralization program Elsevier. 
Government Of Uganda. (2016). The non-governmental organisations act, 2016 
(Parliament of Uganda Trans.). (Act ed.) Uganda. 
Green, D. (2016). How change happens Oxford University Press. 
Green, E. (2010). Patronage, district creation, and reform in uganda Springer. 
Heinrich, V. F., & Khallaf, M. (2005). Assessing civil society in cyprus and across the 
world-the civicus civil society index Johannesburg: CIVICUS, World Alliance for 
Citizen Participation. 
Helle, S., & Rakner, L. (2013). 13. grabbing an election: Abuse of state resources in the 
2011 elections in uganda Edward Elgar Publishing. 
Hulme, D. (2008). Reflections on NGOs and development: The elephant, the dinosaur, 
several tigers but no owl 
51 | P a g e  
 
Ibrahim, A. M. (2015). The role of civil society in africa's quest for democratization 
Springer. 
Imaka, I. (2012). Oil bills: What, how and who is shaping future of sector?. Kampala: 
Imaka, I., & Otage, S. (2014). I was misled into funding 2011 polls, says mutebile. 
Kampala: 
Kafeero, S. (2014). Museveni skips conference on electoral reforms. Kampala, Uganda: 
Kaleeba, N., Kalibala, S., Kaseje, M., Ssebbanja, P., Anderson, S., Praag, E. V., . . . 
Katabira, E. (1997). Participatory evaluation of counselling, medical and social 
services of the AIDS support organization (TASO) in uganda Taylor & Francis. 
Kalinaki, D. (2014). Mutebile lifts the lid on patronage and electoral financing in uganda. 
Nairobi: 
Kasfir, N. (1998). " No-party democracy" in uganda Johns Hopkins University Press. 
Khisa, M. (2017). Desecration of uganda police. Kampala, Uganda: 
Kjaer, M. (1999). Fundamental change or no change? the process of constitutionalizing 
uganda Taylor & Francis Group. doi:10.1080/13510349908403634 
Korten, D. C. (1990). NGO strategic networks: From community projects to global 
transformation PACT Media Services/People-Centered Development Forum (PCD). 
Lang, S. (2012). NGOs, civil society, and the public sphere Cambridge University Press. 
Larok, A. (2009). Protecting the tree or saving the forest? A political analysis of the legal 
environment for NGOs in uganda and an agenda for the future 
Larok, A. (2018). Interviewed by nkwatsibwe, C (06, sepetember, 2018). Kampala, 
Uganda: Nkwatsibwe, Chris. 
Levy, B. (2014). Working with the grain: Integrating governance and growth in 
development strategies Oxford University Press. 
Lewis, D. (2010). Nongovernmental organizations, definition and history Springer. 
Lewis, D., & Kanji, N. (2009). Non-governmental organizations and development 
Routledge. 
Lindenberg, M., & Bryant, C. (2001). Going global: Transforming relief and development 
NGOs Kumarian Press Bloomfield, CT. 
Magaju, J. (1996). An analytical review of uganda's decade of reforms, 1986-1996 
Fountain Publishers. 
Maghela, P. (2018). In Nkwatsibwe C. (Ed.), Interviewed by nkwatsibwe, C (24 july, 
2018) 
52 | P a g e  
 
Makara, S. (2010). Deepening democracy through multipartyism: The bumpy road to 
uganda's 2011 elections GIGA INST AFRICAN AFFAIRS. 
Mawhood, P. (1983). Decentralization: The concept and the practice 
Mitlin, D., Hickey, S., & Bebbington, A. (2007). Reclaiming development? NGOs and the 
challenge of alternatives Elsevier. 
Mohanty, R. (2002). Civil society and NGOs JSTOR. 
Munabi, P. (2018). In Nkwatsibwe C. (Ed.), Interviewed by nkwatsibwe, C (6 august, 
2018) 
Musoke, K. (2002). Parliament responds to the NGO bill 
Mwesigwa, A. (2015). Uganda: NGO bill aims to muzzle civil society, say activists 
Nassali, M. (2017). In Oloka-Onyango J., Ahikire J.(Eds.), A political coming of age for 
ugandan NGOs? the campaign for free and fair elections. Trenton: Africa World 
Press. 
Nganda, S. (2017). Paying the price for the life presidency. Kampala: 
Nkwatsibwe, C. (2016). The citizens’ manifesto case study: Recounting a citizen-led 
advocacy 
agenda in uganda. Capetown: Graduate School of Development Policy and 
Practice, University of Cape Town. 
NRM-O.The ten-point programme. Kampala: National Resistance Movement. 
Nsubuga, A. (2018). Why introduce new taxes to pay off Shs100 million to former MPs?. 
Kampala: 
Okello, L. (2018). In Nkwatsibwe C. (Ed.), Interview by nkwatsibwe, C (14 august 2018) 
Oketch, B. (2016). Police is acting partisan - former IGP, odwe. Uganda: 
Okidi, J. A., & Guloba, M. (2006). Decentralization and development: Emerging issues 
from uganda‘s experience 
Okuda, I. (2015). New NGO bill: Rule of law or is it repression 
Oloka-Onyango, J., & Ahikire, J. (2016). Controlling consent: Uganda's 2016 elections 
Africa World Press. 
Opondo, O. (2017). NGOs and CSOs, are the new fronts of imperialism 
(http://www.mediacentre.go.ug/opinion/ngos-and-csos-are-new-fronts-imperialism 
ed.) 
Pearce, J. (2000). Development, NGOs and civil society Oxfam GB. 
53 | P a g e  
 
Price, R. (2003). Transnational civil society and advocacy in world politics Cambridge 
University Press. 
Redfern, P. (2012). UK suspends aid to uganda after prob. Nairobi: 
Roy, I., Raquib, T., & Sarker, A. (2017). Contribution of NGOs for socio-economic 
development in bangladesh 
Salamon, L. M., & Anheier, H. K. (1992). In search of the non-profit sector. I: The 
question of definitions Springer. 
Scholte, J. A. (2004). Civil society and democratically accountable global governance 
Cambridge University Press. 
Scott, W. R. (1983). Reform movements and organizations: The case of aging 
Sejjaaka, S. (2004). A political and economic history of uganda, 1962–2002 Springer. 
Sewakiryanga, R. (2018). In Nkwatsibwe C. (Ed.), Interviewed by nkwatsibwe, C (23 july 
2018). Kampala: 
Silpakar, S. (2012). Policy advocacy strategies of civil society organizations in nepal 
Southall, A. (1980). Social disorganisation in uganda: Before, during, and after amin 
Cambridge University Press. 
Ssekika, E. (2015). Civil society raps NGO bill. Kampala: 
Ssewanyana, S., Matovu, J. M., & Twimukye, E. (2011). Building on growth in uganda 
Steinberg, Walter W Powell Richard. (2006). The nonprofit sector: A research handbook 
Yale University Press. 
Tabaire, B. (2007). The press and political repression in uganda: Back to the future? 
Taylor & Francis Group. doi:10.1080/17531050701452408 
Tall, M. (1982). Notes on the civil and political strife in uganda Cambridge University 
Press. 
Tangri, R. (2006). Politics and presidential term limits in uganda Uppsala, Nordic Africa 
Institute. 
Tangri, R., & Mwenda, A. M. (2006). Politics, donors and the ineffectiveness of anti-
corruption institutions in uganda Cambridge University Press. 
The Government of Uganda. (2010). The national NGO policy (Parliament of Uganda 
Trans.). Uganda. 
The Guardian. (2012). UK suspends aid to ugandan prime minister's office after fraud 
claim 
The Observer. (2017). Age limit: Police raid action aid offices. Kampla: 
54 | P a g e  
 
Tumushabe, G. (2018). Interviewed by nkwatsibwe, C (16 august 2018). Kampala, 
Uganda: 
Tumwine, P. (2018). Interviewed by nkwatsibwe, C (07, august, 2018). Kampala, 
Uganda: 
UNNGOF. (2015). A position paper and clause by clause analysis of the NGO bill 2015 
Van der Merwe, Hendrik W. (1980). Towards an open society in south africa: The role of 
voluntary organisations David Philip. 
Viterna, J., Clough, E., & Clarke, K. (2015). Reclaiming the “third sector” from “civil 
society”: A new agenda for development studies University of California Press 
Journals. 
Waswa, S. (2014). Museveni snubs electoral reforms forum. Kampala, Uganda: 
Willis, J., Lynch, G., & Cheeseman, N. (2017). “A valid electoral exercise”? uganda's 
1980 elections and the observers’ dilemma Cambridge University Press. 
Young, C. (2001). Uganda under museveni Cambridge University Press. 
Young, E., & Quinn, L. (2012). Making research evidence matter: A guide to policy 
advocacy in transition countries Open Society Foundations. 
  
  
